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PREFACE
to whof moy b# h it greote#

Fobb Flow## r#«orcbci the bom

ro rt o f wor lougbf In fho #%W ëW omloo. Gomrolw o0O#ot$ otW M oo to tb# o ffo o ti o f wor oooe romovW from fmrtoool oowb#. Its sibtools ore tbe v b tW ,
ilvlo@ ood émAg o f bombordmeot from tbe o fr, T b i^ ore soldier, elvlllom «md
beosb-«oH ooogbt to o th e r In one momeot o f ooovulsed ogooy, eoW% oe#rleloosly
fotod by tbe oeoldeoN o f fhm cmd poeltbm.
Tbe bombif^ of Goermloo In
C ivil W or«^

of

wo# on evemt io tb# Sponlsb

l#o w b l# telexed rigbtiit forci» of Germmy ood Itoly w #e

tent to to# iwwly ^ l# e d #rote@le# ood toctlcs. Tbe sovogery of tbe ottock érew
world-wide protest beoowe of tbe probdily well^^feoficM ^mplclom tb # tbe G ermo*» Intended the opersdlon to serve os o oltniool smperlment ediieh would dbr
close tbe effects of o beovy ofr ossoult o#oW on essentlolly non-mllitory db|ec-*
live*
Two yeors b ter, with tbe onset of World Wor II,

bomAls# of non*

combotonts woi to become o routine ^sersebm, but cm ^^erotion tbot nevertheless
rolsed emotional #orms of #eot Intewlty# Todoy tbe Issue, for from hovli^ sub
sided, is control «
There Is o consemu# omm^ mllltory bWorks» tbot the str#eglc oir
offemlve c ^ lm t Gmrmony wos o decisive footer In the ultlmote vletmry of the
A ll I## Thm^e bos not been, nor perbops w ill there ever be, o oorreepondlng
unmlmlty which ensigns o meenurdsle weight or value to tbe port ployed by this

m w method o f worlore. A)thowÿ% nummrout mwmsme#* hove been ewde, none 1$
msneluslve.
ThSft #udy wlH enomine the itrotegio oh o#en#lve egoW t Germcmy
w ilh k i the brood eontext o f A llie d wor oim t ond Hie Him p re v o lll# m lllto ry doetrine#. Em^phosl# w ill ee#er

mo|or obstcmlei thot stood In the woy o f I»

gre#m oW ilevemmt. No #tem pt w ill be mode to cbwrlbe or omen the operotionoi copeoti o f the bonding oompol#% eonduoted by Hie B ritkh ond Amerleon
forces. SW* m ottempt would be prmweptuous In the foee o f the superb o ^ o io l
ehronlole# thot ore now enrolhable to s#lsfy the mo# seorWiIng

Imprlrles. F lno lly,

OS the result o f my endeovon, I hope to drow some gm erol oonoluslons thot hove
relevonoe to the # r# e g io proem s o f todoy.
For the InspW lon underlying this study I owe o debt o f grotltucb to
Doctor A . Stonley Triehett, O m m m g Deportment o f MlWory, Ih ilv e rilty o f Omohe,
who fought me to ovoid o i^wmomenolWlc reoding o f hWory emd to seek for truth
bemeoth the wWs o f In e k^H , ¥m the produ#lon o f the p#m r I mu# thmdc my
w ife , M o ri^ y Feters M w . It wos sW who, w ith msnslderdsle h w l^ t ond tact,
applied the goods th # moved u n i from oontempWlon to o c tlv lty ,

RomT M, m m
June 1965
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CHAPTER i
INTRODUCTION
Before beeoming toe deeply rnieem ed w ith a po rtW le r feeet o f mm
portteyler wm , It I# useful to re fle ct, If only b rie fly , upon the sub|ect o f wor It
self, W ithout some b^lm #l% p h llo K ^ lc c il bosk to old In estobllshlng o per#>eetiv e , no worthwhile purpose would be swved by dredgh^ up portlm s o f whet Is
olreody tW roughly doeumentW history,
Ww os o soclol phsmomenon Is utuolly thought to hove o nolure th #
Is eithm ro tb n o llstlc or ^ te n n ln is tlc , CTi the one hond, thwe who occ#pt the
rotlonollst view believe that wor Is o emstt# of choice or decision. Someone, or
some #oup o f people, consciously ond w illin g ly choos# ergon Iced violence os e
way o f relieving tenslom or redressing wrongs* On the other hond, those fovorlng
o determ In 1st m^lcmotlon oHer such vorled su(we#low fmr the couses W wor os the
em entlolly o@ ^#slve noture o f monklndi &e cycllool economic p#tem s which re
sult in motorlo i é ^ lv o tlo n » ond, hence, cm unrestrolned ocgulsltlveness on the
port ^ the d#*#sed peopW# or even the scorch o f surplio copltol fm new outlets,
thus leodtng to te rrito rlo l e r^ lo lto tlm cmd oolonlollst m pom lon.
W ithout ottemptIng to orgue the v o lld ity

elHier of the two theories,

le t It suffice to soy thot, for this study, o rotlonollst wm dructlon ^ ww w ill be
understood, m d hirthmr, thot the embedImont o f this port leu lor viewpoint Is con
tained In the wrItirMa o f Karl von Clousewltx*
If the prt^sosltlon o f Clousewltz con be reodlly occepteé—thot **wor
1

h only o comtlmmtWn o f Sf#o policy by other meccw,*^ then tome relevant de
duction# eon be drown from gè#ervl% the bchovlor o f n o tio n -# # # In W orld Wor
II. One o f th # e observotlon# is fh # the H itle r Ion exponslonist progrom wos o
nW em archetype o f the Clwmewitzion mcetlm. The fsmlle tron#brm #W o f the
N o tW o l Soclol I# revolution Into o pm po#hit scheme o f extemol wnque# ww
m<mlfe#ly on exomple # how m outhorltorlon govwnment con force Hie progres
sion o f p o litlc o l o c tiv ity from the non-vlole# end o f the ^ectrum to the v io im t
w itW ut, In the process, developing momlve reslstmce w ith in the p c^lo # » .
Another obterv#ion cpiite In contro# w ith Hie Gwmon mcomple Is
thot the expwlwice o f the A ll I# , w hile confonning to ClousewitE* Hieory in out
lin e , was nottble n # for Its conform ity to the theory but for the tempe^wus
omblvolence gpMwr#ed In the movement frmn pence to wor. There Is no evidence
to diow th # , before the w or, ony o f the A llie d governments, elHisr secretly or
oHierwise, hod foreign policies thot were #%pesslvely # ie n t# d , Onom ^ently#
when confronted w ith the need to fig h t to preserve pence, m emottonol crisis
orose omong tlm people because the only ovemie open to co#inue st#e policy
wm one by definition m ntrory to the p o lii^ its e lf. This wos si# » lfim n tly d *ff# m t
1

Quoted in J .F .C F uller, iMw C ondi#
(New Bruiowtek, New j##ey$ Rutgers iSÈnlverïlîy"F ^

2

-------------------------

1789-1^1
p ."l^ .

How Hiis wos done w w b rillk m tly oqsosed hy Hermorm Rmischning
who troced the ideologicol mochln#ions of the N #*onol Soclolisb from the
beginnings to the then prwent (M oy, 193^, ond foretold w ith omoxing occurw y
Hm o#o#fophic events thot follow ed. See TW Revolution of N ih llb m t A Womm to the W e#, trm s. E. W . D ick# ^ s w
ina
7 if ? r

from the situation ins Wo Gotmmy w h#o moss p^# io lo g to o l conditioning o f tho
eltlxonry omwred the oontinulty o f stote policy in the C ornel d#lrod by the Noxi
hierorehy.
The problem o f the A llie d ^ e m m m # then beeome one of m otivoting
the people, wk» were not os attuned to the demger* o f fooism os were their leaders*
This task, that o f r# -# ie n tin g the emotional sub-sfruelure o f a p c ^ le tio n into new
cmd unfam tlke wsys, wos not m easy one*
In W o r to oopture the enthusiosm o f the people, emee war was upon them,
it be#m e wcessory to oompemete for the aversion to violenoe, suboonseioim or
not, w ith a stimulus aao#»tdble to the Judeo-Chrlstiim ethle,

A new mystique

hod to be erecOed m d new goals identified* This fdtenonienon, related m gew rolly
non-#»eetfie tmmts to the Am # Wen experienw , has been deemrsbed by e oo#%tem»»orory p o litlo o l solent W*
The mctremiim of the Amer loon doctrine In refusing to oountmonoe
the use o f foree rmes^t in vmy lim ited elreumstwwes olWws the pmidulimi
to sw e^ for in the ^ p # tte direct Ion ones fore» is undertokm rW em lvely
s# a W s^e ssio n * T W Is, whm fors» fin a lly is resorted to . It #eks vmy
large aims—o k» w h id i, prior to the r# e rt to force, w #e regordbd os ob
tainable only by peoce&l mecm. The psyehologiool attitude w h l# t pom Its
policy mctrem# to be pursued In a d e fm lv e war that could not be purwed
by peaceful means Is i^ fo u s ly m o ttltu ^ o f vm geonw that is more thm
o little reminiscent o f the rightewm postmre o f the medieval wonrior, who
may hove mode war more botbaraus throi^h his oonvlctlon that he atone
fm ^ t for a just cause. We hove noted before the d lffic u lti# Inherent in

^In America, where the feeling against war was the greotm t, the work
o f conversion was nmde eosi# by having b s ^ tlie ob|ect o f direct attack, which
generated a npontoneous sense o f great outrage.

show ily toteronce toward the memy when on# Is convinood that th# #%#my's
oouse is to ta lly utifust. As to th# ^ o rie a n attltud o, th# Qwwtiom Wmod»
that " It Is d iffic u lt not to conclude that this doctrine p\m m almost no w b stm itive lim its upon the specific objectives which may legitim ately be sought
once W ee is employed in cbfense ogolnst s»$pession. " Wor Is to be w r^ed,
m ce It has be#% t b r ^ upon the n o tW , u rn il the enemy surrenders uncon
d itio n a lly m the entire world has been mode safe for democracy* ^
The war aims # the b e lll^ e n ts gfm t out o f the philosc^hicol underpin
nings o f their governments* On both sides the aims were ideological and hortatory,
w hich, m w ill be dismissed later, hod r^rcw ssive effects t^son the m ilita ry stra
te g ic adopted by each.
The loi^-ronge aim o f the Nornis was thus described by Rouschningi
The w sm tiol aim is #epwech%ess, w ith the d#enninatlon to pudi onwards
cmd mnerge from central Européen contimmtol confinem#its cm unscrupulous,
cbctrineless determinat icm to seize enythU^ and to be reocb to do m yth ing
that smrv# the increme of power and dominion. It is a eoncpiistador pot icy
. . . . The aim o f this foreign policy is the revolutionm y 'redW #ution of
the world mW erecthm # m Ommm Gmssrmm, In which everyone w ill Wve
o shore, and the wealth o f which w llî olfS™ vïïy dlfferrm t prospech from
those o f dwring out o f poor little poverty-strickmn Oermceiy, which conmrt
be mode cmy lorgmr by d iv ld lr^ it up. N otional Socialism discovers many
pretexts for its p o litic a l actions; but behind them a ll stands, plain for a ll to
see, the n ih lti# revolution.^
The aims of the A llie s wwre more reactive and short-ror^ed than tW ^ o f
their <^f^>on#its m â were formed w ith in the context o f the Western liberal trcxiitio n .
A ll W wtern nationsmre heavily Influenced by Hie humcme ideals of
C hristianity, the Enlightenment, Hie scie n tific revolution, and from these

4.ynn H. M ille r, "The Doctrine o f Ju# W ar," W orld P olitics, XVI
(Jonuwy, 1964, P* 266.
% #W m lng,

c it., pp. 263 m d 266,

üfid other influemc# the fibere! tro d ltio ii has been distlMed. As for os
W eîjpi policy \$ ecmcerned the most Importent rw u lt o f liberalism has
been the dlmoolotion o f power end p o licy. Liberalism #sw »# tW a ll
states # # eqwoMy intereeted in poem , tW foroe end power politic#' ore
always to h@ deprecated in intern#Im el relations, m d that the co n flict
ing policies o f countries mW pow # groiqss cm u tm lly be hwmmised by
the some m#mm that govern Internal domestic di##m ces—due proce»,
reason, cmmon smse, elementary m orality end institutions such os the
United Nations. Ww on the o th # hond 1$ a completely d ifr# e n t tt# e
of m (i#w ce to peace, on cberration, emd It ism m iy be justified when
fought 08 0 #usode ogoifWt tyrants in o mood of rtghteoio indigpicdion.
Thwi, mcoclnwm force must be used to smd the co n flict os ^ ic k ly os pw*
sible, and so total wars W ght by democracies ^ ic k ly take on m i<hiologica! chw w ter. . . ,
No better illustration of the foregping conciW ^ democracy at war can
be found than in the stoteme# of W iit#on S. C hurchill In his speech to the House
o f Commons, which hod been simmtmed to register a vote of confidence in his new
govermnmitt
You c»k, whet is our policy? I w ill sc^i It is to wage war, by sec,
Icmd, and a ir, w ith a ll our might and w ith e ll the stre*%th that God ccsn
give us# to
war ogolfwt o immstrous tyrormy, never surpowW in the
d # k , Immmtsèle ca fo lo ^e o f humcm orlme. That is o # p o licy. You
ask, V ^o t if our aim? I tm smswer in one word# Victory—victory at
a ll costs, victory m qplte of a ll twrror; victo ry, however b i^ and hard
the rood may be; for w ithout victo ry, there is no w rv iv o l. L # that be
realised; no survival for the British &nplre; no survival for a ll that the
British Dnplre has stood for, no survival for the
and inculte o f the
ages, that mankind w ill move forwwd toward Its goal. But I toko op my
t ^ w ith buoywcy cmd
I feel w re that cmr ^sise w ill not be
suffered to fo il among men. A t this time I b e t entitled to claim Hie aid
o f o il, and I soy, "Come, them, le t us go forward together w ith our united
strength."^
^Dovid Rees, Koreo# The Lim ited War (New York: St. M artin's Frwe,
1944, P* x l.
^Winston S. O iu rc h lll, The Second Wmrld W ig, V o l. H i Their Finest
Hm ^ {Bostons Houghton M lHIm
This wS'fKsTÿW ch
ÏÏÎTRVay 1941) In which the Frime M inister offerW his countrymen n # h l% "but
blood, to il, bars #md sweat. "

W ith such b irrin g wcrcb m c persistent bocbfrop fm their combined efforts,
there Is no reason to suppose thot the A llie s would hove agreed upon any other terms
for the cessation o f h ^ tilltle s than "unccmdlttonal surrender.” A ltbot^h Freslcbnt
F rm klln D# Roosevelt was somewhat #f-hm ded d»out the policy declaration at the
Casablanca Conference o f January, 1943, it is evident that the m att# o f kam the
war would W teffn!n#ed hod been a subject of serious deliberation. Among the
notes corriW by Roosevelt to the prem cW erm ce where the "unconditional w rrender” policy mm announced was this parc^pcphg
The President cmd the Prime M inister, after a complete swvey of
world war situation, are more tW n ever <btmrmlned that peace can cmne
to Hie world only by a total ellm lnotion o f Oefsisan and Jsqxmese war
power. This involves the s t^ le formula of placlt^t the objecHve o f this
wmr in terms of an unconditional surremWr by Omrmany, Ita ly and Jopmi*
Unconditional surrender by tiiem means a reasmable assimmce o f world
peace, fm generatiom. Unconditional wrrend#^ means not the destruc
tion o f the Ommm ^p u la c e , nor o f the Ito) ion or Japwme p t^ la c e ,
but éom mean the destruction of a philoiOfHiy in Germmy, Ita ly cmd
Japan which is bcaed on the cor»pest cmd sub{ugatlon o f other peoplw.®
According to some th o u ^tfu l obsmrv##. Hie dictum of the A llie s carried
w ith in it m t m \y grave in ^ liW lw a for the prosecuting of the war, W t, indeed,
nothing less than the seeds o f future wmr.
The only |ust#fic#ion o f the Western stotemnen % that their conduct
o f Hie war wca diara ctw lstic of democrcmies o f our ogei they submitted
pamivety to the dynamism o f h y i^ b o tic war. They prqpc^ted Hie simp lw and mmt convincing o f myths* the United Natlmw were the hwbingem
o f A j# lce , the enemy was the incam #len o f E vil. In^ipdbie of th in k ii^
cdiout p^m e, which comm after war and Is its real purpwe, u rd il the end

% obwt E. Sherwood, Roosevelt m d Hopkins* An Intimate
Vol. lit Prom Pemrl HoHtor to Y i c t w ' y
Bantam
pp. 3 0 1 -m -----------^
^

o f the dW ruction, they leodb no ^ o r t to ollm o te the Gmwon people from
the H itl# clique m d took no précaution# # ^ ln # t their o ily , w W e om bltlor»
were N edly more of o mystery them those o f H itle r. By the time the Illusions
o f pm^mgowW were dlsslpWed cmd the #sv#nment$ In London end W w h l^o n
had the m^^sort o f fx ib lic opinion in thek w ill to resist, the rewcrds o f victory
hod been lost# EoHem Europe wm $ovi#ti%ed, Germmy divided, m d the
Chinese Communists armed ^ oourt#y o f Hie Rus^m ^ m y . The Second
W orld War hod loid the burWotions for #ie th ird .^
Be^sise the @W o f # n#lom at war m nfro! the momer in which the wor
is fought. It follows th # If fw it ccm be feuW w ith the erne, $u#lcion I#then oast
upon the # h e r. In no imtonoe ho# this been more shosply fowssed then in the
$ till-h e # e d controversy over the a ir #t@cks upm non-oomb#«mts d u ri^ World
War II. If, os Aren suggests, m ecm ln^l effort diould Iwve bem mekb to turn
the Gem»m pe#»le ogoinst their leodmr, then the notmre of the bottle waged
e ^ in s t them bears re-exa»iin#ion.
Hie fo llo w if^ choptem w ill W concm W w ith one o f the w ^ s by W iich
the A ll led war lessors m tt\oé the b # tle to the homeland o f G w nony. This method
o f worfore—the str#eg*c bon^xsrdment o f cities—was uncbrtcdom f# three receoms
(I) H itler hod used it fir# ; 0

it was a way <# #rlkk»} at the mvmy w hile the

ground forces were strengthwied cmd readied for en#a#mnent; 0 the war aln» o i
the A llie s were non-restrl#ive cmd, esceept for the terms o f surrender, indefinite.
O te hce mdy to know the #iocki#% deWils o f the rai«b upon Coveidry,
Hmnburg and Dresden to under#and th # a save# cmd utterly conclusive tetdm ^ue
hod been found to aid man in his m elm ^holy drift toward self-destruction. And

%aymond Aron, The Cmtury of Total W # (New York# Doubleday &
Company, Inc., 1954, p« "55. ' ‘ ' '..... ' '.......

8

yet, d i^ îtô its ebvWu# pmmWe, It w # mmethod of worfore used by neither slife
to the lim its o f its p # m tie !. th e mWeovor of this #udy w ill be to desmrtbe the
mcsiy eonstroints th # c*#ed upon the A ll led bomber forees*

ÎÔ

Some o f these were

oirmmmtmtiol# shortc^es o f men cmd equipment, Ine^erlenee, tW m ologieel in odecpmeles, m d o fmsk o f wsentWl infonn#ion ^ « n c rlly m ilita ry l# e l!lg e n o 4 *
Others were bW w 1eristie—doctrinal pre|udioe, #m tegic rig id ity , o n o ly tiw l error,
m d ethical m nd itlm lrq ;* A fter a b rie f prelude to s tro t^ lo b e ^e W m n t In the
form o f oopsuWed p in io n s on the sdb|eet, eoWi o f Hie omWrolnts mentioned above
w ill be addressed, some In ewre detail than others. F W IIy , whatever eonstruetive Im em this in ve # tl# tb n may s u ^ ^ t w ill be o#ered for e ritie e l evaluation.

e rp o lly ln #ru #lve analysis oould be done using the Gormm
Lufrw@#e os the subfm t. Such a sWdy would reveal a ewrked o^emeetry bWween
the two # ts o f fdetort regelating the A llie d ond German #r#eg$es.

C H A rriR îi
C O N aîC TIN O CHINIONS
The Hme îs p # h c# et h#W when (w%me«*# m the itfo te g te f eeqtbyed
m World Wor II &m be foneed w ith on #»{eotîvlty mWIng from pronowncemmt#
mode Ifi the oftwmoth o f the war. Hten c^tnicMw w #e fmmed w ith the heot o f the
ooiH liot s till tenqw rii^ iW ivIduoI blases. Vcrious arguments were supported wlHi
the vigpr thot ecm only com© from pmrtlc% ^*on in the events o f the ttaie. New#
however# greotmr re fle # iv lty Is pwslble; time hos broodened perspectives end the
developmmt o f on histo rlm l Htwcdure Ws tmded to synHmize heretofore w ireloted facts into o dewier vnderstondlr% o f Hie evw it m it reotty oceunred*
On© imue which gave rise (é x rti^ end after Hie ww) to shcrp disagreemmits among A llie d str#egists ond m ilita ry theorists was that of the effe#lvw ess
o f the strategic o ir Wfenslve ago in# Gemwmy. ^ The bo#Rbli% of #>|ectives for
bdiind# omi d ire ctly ynreloted to# the bottle lines mptmmdoé o rodteol excurslm
from clossicol m lllto ry tcmtlcs. Extreme c lo W on the port o f Its o(#iermts ond
#»ponen*s d ik e served to isolot© the orgwment ftom re o lity ond to megger#© Its
slgniftconoe over ond cbove the true re lo tk x d ilp o f o pest to Its whole# O piniom
genw olly followed troditlonol service lines olthowgh# os w ill be seem# e%c#*tlom
were to be found, Even w ith in the o ir service thwe were thwe opposed to the new

^The #rotegic o ir offensive r^sresmted the efforts c f the Cond^lned
Bomber O ffem lve n ^ in # Ommonyi the concmted actions of the Royal A ir Form
Bond)#r Cemmmd m d the United St#es Strategic A ir Forms In Europe#
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doefrlme# but far r#m#w dliftlm ifar to the view# of their edleogue# in other ser
vices.
Among the severest critics o f the beWsIng $ tr# ^ y wcs Adm lial Sir
Gerald DIckem o f the ir ltld i Royet N ovy. W riting offer the war In a po lite W
rm olute attack upon the theories o f M ordxil of the R « ^ l A ir Fwce Sir Arthur
tfrHTls, wcrtime A ir 0 # lc e r Coiiwi«mdtng-ln-Oi1ef# Bomber GoRmomd# Acbstroi
Dickens qumtioned both the m illtm y value and the ethical basis o f the Royal A ir
Force booAer offm slve ^h ich # of co ixie . Implied a sm iilar criticism o f Amerlocm
#m tegy).

2

His thesis, on the m llltw y sids, alleged violation # two rather # re lg h tfmword m axim . The firs t, m cw d b^ to Sir G erald, w w the wrongful neglect o f
the meed to meure "v ita l minimum security* ** Because B ritain was prim m lly o marl*
time power, the d@#tru#ion o f Gmmw mipowwr—especially the oAmorlne threatshould hove been ehesen m the strategic key#one. Hcwever, insteW o f m o kl^
direct ottodm on the U-boat menace, the weight o f the ovalldble s trlk ii^ force
was directed to submarine production fo c llltl# # pediqpf of long-term b e iw fit, W t
certainly not m km edlote cmswer to the #rar^#I$%g d#Mred#lons of the Gemwm
raiders*^
A »oci#ed w ith the failure to put fir# thirqgs fir# mm the (toporture from
the principle o f "ob|eatlve" wherein a ll fw cm are united In the pum iit of a
^G w ald D ick# » , Bombii»i emd S tn # w : The Fallacy o f Total War
Owondom Sompeon le w , MorWon & C o ., I d j. ,
''
% W ., pp. 1 ^ 2 5 .

lî

endeavor. Admiral Dickens oomsldorad that #%# e fW s o f H&e

A ir Faroe

wore preod over a nw ilrîplîalfy o f W m , but w # , for eoë%# Im uW ale# *trw # h
to gain mo#ery over any one o f #hem* In portlaular he decried whol he Ihooght
to he o lock of coordination cmd Integration o f planning w ith the British Army cmd
Navy. This defleleney In picaming had the é to l effe## of# on the one hcmd, on
uneconomical use o f o ir power, and on the oHier, a m M t-ovailobîlîty o f o ir support
when (md where it wos meded by the ofhw servie#. ^
)^ w t from purely m ilita ry foctors, etolcol cmd m #el ob|ectWm to the
strategic o ir o^mwlve w #e raised by Sir G erald. #1$ # îtîq u e o f the $ tr# # y in
voked m dl#!nctlon between w h# w # the principal and whot the occeseory. In
plead(1% frv prop# recognition cH mds cmd moms, he branded the wholeeote de
struction cW the l# s o f non-combotont llv # m Ifim qtodlent. If, he sold, men ere
foolish enou^ to rn i^e ^ In w crfcre, their lock o f wlsdmii It im t thm {ustifleatlofi
for hophozcrd memo* On the ccmtrwy, there Is a positive ob ligo tlm to !##«#
the esoUsnltous otpects cd warfare In every way possible. This line of reosonl#^
wos capped by his belief that the attainment of a j# t and kstlng peoce Is preju
diced In dir#st proportion to the lock o f restraW practiced by the ultim ate victcvs
w hile securing their victory.

5

Even though the views o f Admiral Dickens «mnstltute o categorical rejec
tio n o f the str#egy behind the Combined Bo#Aer O ^m slve, there Is wpreseed
% id ., n>. 31-42.
% y . , pp. 75-81.
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throvghouf hî$ w riting a profound cfprecisition for o ir power in the obstroot. It is
only w ith Its W#W Wcr II cpplicotlon thot he quowekf
An oltogether difFmrent opinion o f the role o f #tr@t#;*o o ir power wm expremed by Mo|or A lexm d# P# de Seversky.^ He olm believed th # the great
bombers were misused, Im t his t<fo# grm out o f o oonoef# foot w w os extreme in
Its fundommtols os Admiral Dickens* con#f# mm comenrattve# For from occepting the idea that the strategic effort wot Im ufficlently Integrated with Im d and
sea power, Sevmsky held that the whole W o ir power wm insufficiently exploited*
Whatever m lsfbrtm # it oxperkmoed w #e the raswlt o f failure to obtoin fu ll com
mand o f the skies. O nly by achieving such m ^m socy m uld the bomber# r«m ^
freely and perform the mW om frxr which they Hod been dmdgned*^ Further, he
believed that a ir power alotw could Iwtng victory. In Seversky's wmrdsi
A ir power okme con impose surrm d# on on enwsy. . . .The goal o f a ir
power cfp tie d W ro ^ lc a lly Wnot bodblng m on end in Itself but m # w W
o f th e g lr. Inwhl#% bom&lng is m Incldetoalprocedure. O n # a'lwi'fcm
Ï3«15fîppid its odvmsory M a ir paw #, d ra in in g the r l^ t o f way o v #
hi# te rrlto g , bom blf^ fo llcw t m n#toed to confirm the victory m d enforce
w rrend#,
Seversky has lm% been on mrckmt cmd imoomprommliqi cxIvoW e o f a ir
power. His w ritiiig s ore polm niool, but, W# a sow#, fiercely hone#. Hence,

^Alm m n^ F. de Sevmsky, Air Fewer# Key to Survival 0^sw York#
Simon md Së$u#er, 1950).

^IbW., pp. 197-22J.
®tt»id.,p. 198.
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in evaluating the future o f atr power, he demomk thot the prepw otlm o f modem
strategies be hm&d more upon lemom dwtved frorn the fo ltu r# # the po# them
from suoamm.

9

A third e ritic o l view o f the sfrot«^le a ir offom lve he» been supplied by
Ker# RoWrts <&eenfleld in o book o f reflective #soys upon Amerloon yomd stra
tegy dbring the war*

His opinions s#ve at o w fu l oompfoment to tW re dis-

mmed above beemmt they r# # # e n t o loholarshlp m rlehed by bng ossoeiatim
ÏI
w ith the United # o t# Army; m ldîtioim lly they provide a bakmee to the Navy
cmd A ir Force pemmtlor# o f Dlokens and SeverAy, G reenfield orgu# that the
stratégie oa* offensive w w on influe to lo l factor la the défont o f Gmmmy, but not
0 decisive cm# (In the sen# o f dellv#im ^ the victory). W hile giving generous
rec^m ltlon to the m llltc ry contributions o f the a ir arm, he cites mm%y deficiencies
w ithin the A llie d a ir e ffo rt, most o f which he attributes to orgcmlzotlrmal prdblems
cmd to inter-iervlce strife cmd bull-heoéscbw#.

Î2

In évoluâtl#to the bonfo# o o n ^ lg ^ he notes that, by the time It hod
reached its peak o f effectIvenem (early 1945), Hie ground f o r ^ o f the A llie s hod
by then v irtu a lly #uA ed Hie Germcm m îlltctfy nmcàlne* His mafor concession to

.

221

RabMrti G fM tifi*ld , Amwicon Str<rt*ty in World War H< A
R #m m id##an # @ltWares Th# jofow TKpw SnR m S^^
^ ^Doctor G reenfield served from 1946 to 1958 os Chief Hisforlon o f the
DeporWmt o f tW Army,
^^G reenfleld, op. c it., p p ,# - 112#

M

the Combined B w è #

mm that " It hW emd the internal e o lls ^ of

Like Dickens, G rem fleld deplored the lndls#lm lnote choro#er o f the
boadblng* He eorefully dlsHngwlshed between the Am#leon ta ctic o f doyllgfit pre
cis im bombing s ^ ln s t selected tm ^ f ^#em s and the k ltis h technique o f night
time crea bonding. W hile m #ki% the obviou# operational differences, he con
cluded, nevertheless, that in practice the rwuIts were the some—a nxnsive bludge # itf^ succeeding more from sheer weight o f repetitive effort thon from "p ickle
barrel” accuracy. Etosplte their sera itlvlfy to the comequenc# o f m m attacks,
Hw American leaders, he states, were often <»sqtoll#d by the cirasnstances o f
adverse weather and prksitlve bllnd-bcsAlng techniques to use their forces in a
fashion not unlike the B ritish.
As a fin a l crgument, O rem fleld, w ith o Jilnt of satisfaction, informs
his readers that the Combined BomW O ffem lve mode its most te llin g cofWrlbutlon
to the A llie d canqsalgn in o purely to c tiW role—whm it conducted a s&etalned
attack upon the German tmnspcrtcSlen sy#cm in p rq ^ o tlm for the Normandy
invcnicm. In this com ectlon It is o f W erW to note tha t, durir^ this $dmse o f
cqwotlens, the Combined Bomb# Offensive perfomed under the d ire # mmmmd
o f Supreme HeWqtmrt## A l 1led E^qmdltlonmry Fore#, function!#^ apart from the
ccnitrol o f foe a ir power qpeclol### who, G reenfield Incites, would not have
sanctlcmed such employment of their form s*

pp. 117-118.
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M w fool of the Rc^ol A ir F#ce Sir Arthur Harris stood, not ofow but
omfuqilouously h i^ , among the sndivicbols who championed the strsdeglo bombing
policies o f the A llies* Even though he l^ w his critics to be legion, he emlntoined
throughout the war o d o g ^^ fa ith in Bonfoer Command emd Its toctlcs* In @bluntly
(W alled ocm unt o f his wartime years, he upheld the logic o f his emtlons emd colled
to task those in high p lo c# who hod either oppowd his proposals or thwcnrted his
programs*

16

Sir Arthur believed thot the war msuld be won by a carefully plom W rmd
prop#ly executed boWmr ©ffmwive*

17

The #ength o f his opinions fe ll sho# of

the extreme positîvîty of those o f Seversky, W t amor^ his cmtemporcrles they
w #e none the lees coWrovmrslal*

A lth o u j^ the Marshal may hove s^ee d, in

theory, w ith the M ajor, he was too much o f o pra #lcal eoldW not to h illy opprecW e the

doctrinal ottachmeids o f the o th # two services and, m a cora l-

Icry, the ostoremce o f their p#$lst#ice« Always the prs#m atl#, he saidi
W inning o wear by bom bir^, as at th # ten# we were prapraing to
do, m o tm m several things* It may mean b r îi^ ii^ the memy's war
e#srt so con#W #ly to a stond#lll foot ym are invited into the country
to c le # up the m#s; In which mse the only #m y you w ill need w ill be
a w ell-trained police force* Or it may mean little more than sofrenli^
up the enemyfo défoncés, m nm unlcations, m d wm Imd%»tries so (# e c tiv e ly In #hÂmce o f a w e ll p r^w e d Inrasim that that inveslm goes

^^Arthur Hm ris, Bomber Offensive {Lmdm# Collins, 1947),
p. 54.
Lionel limay. The MemoW of Qenawil Lartl Imwy (New Yorki
The V iking Press, 1960), pp* 245 and # # * '.................. ........ ......'' ' '
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occordlng to plcmi \n w h i^ cate you w ill meed a Iwge oml v # y w e llequlmod wmy, AW , o f o w te . It may inam , m d probably do# mem,
sometliifig betoem these two alternative#.
The found#im o f H #rb* operational eredo was painfully single—bmnb
the cities wherein German w # -s# ta in ln g industry was located. He did not shrink
from odmlmion foot this Inevitably memt fa ta liti# among nm -condxtfm », hot he
rather caval ie rly explained away the neW w ith c i# ie s o f dmifow justIflcotions,
a ll # which reduced to a fm n o f "war Is hell** # titu d e * The o r^^e n to tlo n could
hove been mccfo sponger by placing #rect# emptonis i^o n the ravings In A llie d
rxnuoltim where the derations were raccessfol to the extent o f avoiding lend m gogements In the cmcult o f the o b |e c tlv # .^
"Bomber** Harris, m he was celled, was utterly candid cèout the m rly
failures o f Bomber Conmmd, but urawervlngly loyal to its ultim ate successes. He
remained to foe end ur^erturbed about the in a b ility o f his staff and the Americsm
to resolve foeir lo r^ ^ o n d it^ dîffmence over the most effoctive moctos ocerondl
To Sir Arthur foe m ctt# was not worfoy o f argument. His own vindlmsdion of night
bombing v#su# daylight "precision'* bonfoing derived, he claim ed, from achieve
ment—not theory. By the middle o f 1944, cmd coincldm it w ith the d e te rio r# i# i
o f Genncm a ir defense, the British ottemks, according to Hcmris,

. .proved to be

r#her more cxtoumto, mudi heavier In w eight, end nrare concetoroted, foon the
Americcm dayligfo cdtocks,. . . .

21

^ % c rrii, op, c it. , p. 54,

His views were th#® o f a stolwcart man

^ b id . , pp. 176-177,

17

wbot® lasting oceamplishment# followed a la r^ # r i# o f firin g batti##—w ith frlem b
cmd foe a like ,
Farhq» le u paroditol, cmd omrfofoly lets enrattonalfy c h o r ^ , was Hw
overview of stroteglo a ir power w rltton fo 1946 by Owwral Carl A , S pw tz, who
oommanded the Ifolted St#es Strcdegtc A ir Forces In Europe.
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The cool cfofoc-

tiv ity o f General Spaotz, a t c o lo re d w ith hi# counterpart. Sir ^ ih u r H arr»,
may be mq^lained either at a temperammtal dlfrerence betwem the two men, or
because Spoatz had not, as did Harris, over two demades o f service In m irk ^ e n d#*t a ir force* His position, then, m a general officer in the United St#es Army
could very w e ll smcount for his tenqpered appraisal o f the role o f a ir power In the
defe# of Germany.
General Spaotz Introtfowd On interesting verlant to the them# of Harris*
He sugge#ed that the outcome of the wmr m lÿ it have been difforent had the Nazis
used strategic bombltto

® vm t sm ie.

The penalty they paid for their falW e

to capitalize on pmwessed ski Ik so evidently m n # # lb le w ith the # ra t# ic bombing
concept was nothing l# s them their total defe#,

24

^C m ri A * Spa#z, "S t(# ^ ic A lr " l^
TW
MGt o f A ir Few#, ed« Eugene M* Emme (Princeton, New J e rs ^ i D. V aJT^H ffS id
C oiîÿeBiy,'i
*
^ b id . , pp.
^IroB ioolly, H itle r teera to hove grayed the idea o f strategic b o d in g ,
but he Imd m t the singleness of puipose to mém o f it a reality* In Berlin, on 25
July 1 9 ^ , he said # a d a ily m ilita ry aonfmrencet
I have olraW y fold you. * .tW tm m con only be Woken by tmrror* One
has to counter-cdlack, everythir^ else Is m m m m * * . .In my opinion we should
use our plam s for attacking them d ire ctly, m ^m clally since foey are p u ttl# } so
mmy pkme# In the air* . . .But we are hm dllng them w ifo kid gloves. It Is
^ in g fo wmrk only If we attack their c iti# system atically. . . .1 con only w in
the war if I dW roy more o f tim enemy's than he (fostroys o f ours.
Rc^zztswi in H itle r Directs His War, ed. Felix G ilb # t (New York: O i^ d University
Press, 1 9 5 0 ) , ' 3 9 ^ 4 1 . ' ~
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In foe maffer o f foe svpremooy o f oir In foe bottle c ^ W t Germony,
Spootz oonetuded that foe .H i# could m t hove mm foe wor solely w ith itrotegle
bofifoert. The bcslt for his belief rested not In o diravowol of foe bonfoing strategy,
but in foe framework of time In which the wor wos fought. Hod foe A llie s enterW
foe mm w ith the o ir power they wmre cbte to drw r t^pon ot foe end, there erauld
uncbubtedty hove been m entirely d lffo rm t chmractmr to the ^ m fllc t—one In whicfo
foe new technique of ercrfore m uld hove been the dominant fo r# . But os it was,
the long deloy required to build to mmlmwm #r#% fo geve to o ir o peatIdpating—
but not ^ ^ )o n d # w t-^ a re in the vIcW y o b r^ w ith see m d lo n d .^
To «toPoH his own cqqxraliat, the General quoted foe opinions o f several
re^oosible enemy o fflc io li. Oms of foe most relm^mt stotmsm# wos ottrfbuted
to Lieutenant G en#ol Limnorz, commomW of foe 26fo Pmzm Division, who sold
during Intenogotlofi on 26 ju m 1945$
In my
you m ight hove wcm the wor tfoough strategic bombing
olone—granted odequ#e bmm, tm tlm lîy m m m d. Since you wm tod
to end the wor ^ îc k ty , you did n # rely on strategic bombing clone;
you fought the war in combined op##ions on land, sec, and o ir. A t
the b ^In n in g o f foe wmr we fo iW to see that foe m # # Io t power o f
the ooolltlon r^ In s t m was strain enough to dW ray w#r war Im W rles
by #rat#g1c o ir attacks, even If we took foe whole G ontlnm t. As our
Iwdms c o u l& 't eee th is, m d os ymi were m w lllln g ly to rely m tlre ly
on s tr# ^ ic bm nblt^, ymi brought the wm to m oartym d niceeefoil
clew by bW$ strategic orW tactica l me o f o ir power
A ll of the forego 1$^ m$pressIons # opinion serve m b a d ^ m W mcderlal
for a nrare detailed mramlnotion o f foe # ra n ^ lc a ir offom lve cmd some o f Its llm ltenions* As cm irtrocfoctfon to this dlsoitsion, cm observât km o f Seversky Is p e rtl^^Spootz, op. c it., p. 236.

^ fo ld . , pp. 232-223.
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c n m m hi
EARLY c o N a m

The

mr concepts ailmlnotti^ tn Hie opmxtiwis of the Combined

Somber Offensive of World Wor II hqd their origin# In World W<sr I. Germm bosd>Ing roids over Imndon by Z^ppeUm mW glcmt Gotbo bomb## emmd oonstdercèle
constmnotiwi cmd promoted o SrifIdi govemmmt lnv##lg#ory committee to mtess
the threot from the stondpoint of gyordlng
u tility of the toctic m a method of

It cmd, o*#, to determine the
Field Morshol io n Chrtsflon Snmts of

the Union of ^ u th Afrlcso wot the committee dioim m i. One of the repo#* Issued

by the committee stoted#
A ir Swvlce# . .c m be used m m Incbpemknt meor» o f wor operations.
Nobody that witrmmed the # tw k on LmWon m 11th A lly could have cmy
doubt on then point. Unlike m tllte ry, on air fleet con eondbct extmslve
«^motions far from, and IndepmWmtly
both Army «aid Merry* As for
m can at present be foreseen there I* dbsolutely no iW It to the scale of
Its future ind^m m W t war use* And the de^ may not be for o # when oertol
^ s ro tlo m w idi their devm totlm
enemy laWs and deWruction of Indin**
tria l ami populous cent## on a vast scale may become the principal operw
tlons of wear, to which the o l ^ fo rw o f m il Itcry <md naval operatior» may

become secondary end subordinate. *
In America# however# fh#e wo* very little undertdondli^ of the military
potential of olr power. Although the olrplomi wm m excltli^ coition to the
military arsenal# the scheme# for Its employment were tWedlve cmd# for the most

The Second Report of the Prime Minister*# Committee on Air Orgmilza*
tion and Name Defense Again# Air Raid#, ** doted 17 August T9T7, ^o#ed In
Emm®, cy. pit. # p. 35# As a result of this report # i Independent Bombing Force
was e#3m 3% and soon followed by an outononraus Royal Air Force.
20
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part, developed on an ad hoc basis. In fact, one senior Army officer described
the fledgling staff of the A ir Service as a "lo t of good men running around in
circles.
After the United States entered the war a young major named W illiam
M itchell was sent to Paris as a repr^entative of the A ir Service. He remained
in France for the duration of the war, rising rapidly through various staff and com
mand assignments to the rank of brigadier general. In May of 1917 he visited
Major General Hugh M . Trenchard, then commander of the Royal Flying Corps,
and listened attentively to the crusty British general as he explained his ideas
about the offensive nature of air power, the value of deep-penetration bombard
ment, and the need for a unified air ccxnmand. These became the principles that
guided M itchell until his death.^
During the time that M itchell held the position of Chief of the A ir Ser
vice, First Army, American Expeditionary Force, he lacked the resources to mount
anything more than a token bombing effort against the Germans.^ Although a

^Wesley Frank Craven ond James Lea Cate (eds.). The Army A ir Forces
in World War II, V ol. I: Plans and Early Operati<ms: Jonuwy 1%9 to August
(Ch icogo: The University of Ch icc^go Press, 1
, p 11
^ Ib id ., pp. 12-16.
^ h e total weight of U. S. Bombs dropped during World War I was 138
tons—or 275,000 pouncb. (Craven and Cate, I, 15.) During the first month
(August 1940 of Its operations in World War II, the USAAF dropped 166 tons.
("Statistical Appendix to Overall Report [European War] ", The United States
Strategic Bombing Survey (Washington: U. S. Government Printing O ffice,
lW 5 ] , p. if . )
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Strategical Aviation

of the Air Service had been formed <md o eemprehem*

stv® plan laid down for the «Htack of German tmrgeti# the field form* had nelth#
w fflelW bomber* to emfy out the plm# nor, even hod the eqpipmmt bem availdbie, the approval of f^for Genwal .Mm J. Fmèing, ooamond# of the Amerl-

em Expeditionary Force.

5

The limited bombir^ succesm mrpwrimcW by the Allie# were encoun^Ing to the extent that on agreement wa* reached cm 3 October 1918 to mreate on
Inter-Allied IncMxmdent Air Force under the general iuperviiMi of Mmbal
Ferdinand FWi# the Allied Supreme Coammdmr* Operational mmmand wa# to
be vested in Trenchard, cmd the mn#egy premmtly pattermd aftmr his convic
tions. Evm

Mitchell** hxrce* would have become m Integral part of the

unified commmd, the Wilton Acbiinlstmtion severely prorarlbed for the Anerlean
element cmy form of strWegy that would have

. ,a# it* ob|ective, promiscuous

bombing upon lmà#ry, commerce or populatW, in enemy aountrie# ditassociated
from obvimm military ##ed* to be wmvod by axdi a c t i o n # t n any event, the pro
tect was abandoned with the #lgning of the Am Mice a month later#
The 1^ 0* of TrendKxd md Mitchell had a great deal in omnmon with
thoee of General Giulia Douhet, m Italian ex-aavalrymcp and an advomad
thinWr on the sub{e# of air poww. Daub# believed that the next war would be

^Alfred F* Hwley, Billy rMitchellt Crusader for Air Fow#^ fr4ew York#
Frrniklin Watts, In c., 1964, p. 33#
p . 37.
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total mâ wouW Involve the heartlandb of the mmhotw#*. The woy to #*we
haortloiKh was, of oowse, through the air# New wdncmoe and ohemlml munition*
wmild put at risk the enemy*# vital oerHer*, which, <mce reduced, would cau$e
him to sue for peace Wore land and tea force# hod been committed to long, bloody,
and indeclWve mgagement*# The key to this mapfsèlllty wo# olr superiority, which
would permit, after the de*trueti<m of the enemy*# otr defeme, unimpeded transit
over hi* territory# All of thme <^»er#lon* would be conAicted by cm ImWpendwt
air arm whose octivltW would not, exm# in a gcmerol $mm, be omociated with
the ob|ectiv#s of eithar the onwy or the novy#^ Before he died in 19^, Douhet
could reflect upon the reward* of hi* pre#lence—ridicule, in^isemmmt, oW
wide^eod, obtuse d ^elief.
The war w$ded withcxit the Wvooate* of strategic bombing having had an
^poftunity to {xove their theories. The im^-term effect of their tnc^ility to cite
historiool evidence In support of their the**# wm to dmy them, in the UNsîted
State* at lee#, any mecmingful occ^tmee of the new Idw*. That olr should be
independent of both sea and lemd, cxgonlmtlmally and opemtionolly, wo* regarded

m 0 heresy too mctreme to be token seriously. On the oHm^ Wmd, the demonstrated
effect iveme## of olr power in support of battlefield obfectlvm argued Wrongly for
the oontinuonce smd, indeed, the sirei^thmfilt^ of air In th# role#
In Ore# Britain the situation wo# wmewh# di#@rent. As a ossmmipmm

^Otulio Douhet, The Commcmd of the Air, tram# Dino Ferrari (Mew
Ymrk* Edwcrd McCann, I
, pp. '
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o f Smuti*s recommendation the Royal A ir fkree hod been formed os a seporote and
:mM*endent smvioe on \ A pril Î918*

S

The yeen of autonomy betwem the war#

fxovtded Oft <^»portufiity for novel and leonoolasMe #rategle* to be developed.
Under Trenchard, now an A ir Marshal and Chief o f the A ir Staff, Hie domrlne of
strategic bcmbmrénent vwp» refined m d extemkd to the point where it was su^eited
that, in war, mafor r e lia n t diould be placed upcm the offensive strength of the
p
bombers.
The mposwre of England to Gerwm bomblr^ raids during World War I
unc^estiondily fostered a ciimeHe of opinW (essentially vengeful) that was at least
pcrtiolly receptive to the new air doctrines* The real fxablem wm that although

the new fmoe was thought to have cwwldmrc&le strategic potential. It was a fmrce
additive in cost to boHi the Royal Navy m d the Royal Army, The vm #able tra
ditions cmoeWed w ith the two old<w servlcm m d the myriad loyaltle* attcMitng to
each prevented any wicMpreod belief that air could easume ckfeme bu rdm at the
esqpense o f either o f the sw ior services.

Thus, when World Wcr || come, the

Derek Wood m d Derek Denqpster, The N #row Margin* The W tle of
Britain m d the Rise o f A ir Fowm' 1930-19# j^lew V brb
S ^ S m y , "{nc7, 19&1f, p i " S I '
^Chmrles W aster and NcHile Frmkland, TW S ^ e g lc A ir Offensive
%alnst Oermcmy 1939-1945, V ol. Is Preparation''Kdiklont' M# M a |S K *s Ifa 'tm ^ y
iW ))T p . Sé.
^%©b@rt Saum&y, A ir Bombard## #* The Story of Its Development (New
York# tW rp# & Brothers, 19^î)7W "3FQ 531pprTBP®rH
however, that the Brttîdi in t# # ts in Iraq, Trm forckiii ami Aden during the period
between the w m were secured by the Royal A ir Force. Using precision b o d in g
tochniqumt again# the villages of rW rW m y desert tribesm#%, the British were able
to maintain air w ntm l aver vast #r@tëws o f tmrritory without the expense of sup
porting Icrge occupation fore# in those mom*

design# of Treneherd hod not moterîalîzed into e fomldeWe offe#$#!ve eopabilfty.
For no to## sigpilfioW remon them ooncorn for its own syrvivoi, the Royal A ir
FOree began the war m the defensive.
In the period between the w m the Ibiited States military ^iloeofHiy was
rtmrowly defsmsive. The emotional pemdwlvm-ewing a ft# World War I had birowgW
wlHi it Q determined Wlotionism# th e m ili$#y task wea viewed m being limited
to the defense of the West#n hemisj^iere—a tcsA Ideally suited to the W te d States
Navy, Not being entirely unmindful of the experismces of World Wm* I, the writers
of m ilitary doctrine did accept the populate that. If wm come, only m offmwive
s tro t^ y could prevail, and that memt the Oonquest of om land csmy by onoth#,
lu t because it was the intention not to again becmne involved In a ^e o f ftxelgyi
wm , only a oeoll sta n d i^ mwiy wo# maintained^ a dedsian fortified h f the knowfe d ^ that, if the need arose, divisiom could again be mobilized and tron^orted
overdo# to the crena o f ccmffict.
This doWrine wm not h illy o c o ^ e d by the A ir C o r^. Loyal to the ideas
&hough not the Imubmdlnot® toctim# o f lî f ly M ltd ie il, the A ir C o ^ Toctioal
Sdiool favored a # r o h ^ based vpm the dmtiuetlon of tW w ill of the enmny to
eeotinue fa tin g . This would be done by bombing the elmmmts o f his society
imcessory to provide for ondsuj^ort h it m ilitary fore# <md, at the some time.

H# S, Hcmsell in Hie Muir S* Fairchild Addnm to the A ir War
College, Mmewell A ir Force Base, Alcboma, 1 De#md># 1964. M aM General
Fksnsell, ÜSAF $tet«), is a distinguished m llilery scholw cmd was a leading A ir
Corps planner before and during World Wcr II.
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tbreotenlig the swvival of his govemmmta* apparatus heczmse of the great lufforirg (mpowd vpm the population* The wleotW of Individual target# wa# to bo
mode by m#oi#lng a highly prwtloal Wmulo that weighed both to r^ worth cmd
the probability of a smcewfyl attack ogaWt It, (See Appendix Î ,) Ih ît doctrine
formed the patten f#r the air o ^n # ivo | oHwr éscnifte# were develi^imi fm air de12

fmue arW air

of the wrfoc# forces*

rei^xmslbilltf#

The reco^ltlcn of the trl-pcntite

thcd the Air Corps had aé#@d v\mm of air power that

were le# extreme than those held by some of their luropecm wntemparwles.
In Octdmr, 194!, the Secretaries of Wcr md Navy wwe directed by
the Fr#ldent to pr^xsre their Wimat# of what each of the swvicei would respire
In the event of wee* Unfortwwtely, neither a strategic purpwe nor a set of qual i
fying s#umpti#a was contained In the hr#ldent*$ m#sege« There were no begin
ning "ground rules" so each service prepared Its retpkements on the basis of how
its plorm## fbrecs# the United St##* participation In the war. The Navy saw a
vast naval stmggle with

while the Army visualized a wntlnental effort

against Oemxmy—with all of Its camplm problems of tromsportatlan aW loglstl#.
bemersed In a bag of detail, the War Department had little time to com
pute the ree^lre^fiis of the Air Corps* Thus, whm Hie Air W # Fkaw Dlvsslmi of
the Office of the Chief o f Air Corps offered to submit chi Air Annex, the gesture
wc# ^#e& lly accepted. But whm the <Hniex wm revlewW in its final form there
wm bitter eppmltMi to Its Inclusion by a mmkm of officers an the General Staff#

13
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The mquiremenN expressed therein, m d the estlmqted resource elleeetlen to sup
port them, were by m meons eommrvotive. Notwithstanding this opposition,
Oeneroi George C. MetshoH, Chief of StoFF, directed the Inclusion of the annex
In the plcm fotworded to the Secretory o f Wor.

Despite its sdtoinlstmftve support by the O iie f of Staff, the A ir Corps
p lw (des*$p%@ted AW FD-Î) d#ered In it# boele phlloso^y from those o f the Army

ond the Novy. AWPD-1 m d its fdllow-wp pim, AWTO-2, loîd the groundwork
for the employmmt of ikilte d Sted# olr power* In the se#km deoling w ith stre*

tegy AWFD-Î ploeed first # io lty on m o#r o##»lv# ogaimt Germony, id o tii^
thot the end purpme of the olr w#r would be;
To woge o swtolned ok offemlve cgoliwt luropeon Axis M llito ry power.
To opply olr pm m for o breakdown of the W ustrlol and eowomW stra©ture <^^Gemxmy* To sufqmrt o final offmsive if Invasion bemm# neoes-

The snpt ieotlon o f the p irn wm , unmlWekAly, thot ok could conceivdbly
win @victory without on Invasion being necemsy, Nswm^er, when Hie overoll
picm wo* prepored by tl# Joint A n n )^ o v y Board, there wm not even o pmstng
reference to the "sustokied olr o#m#ive, " ond the domlmmt #rot<%*c o o n c^t
\
pc#uloted the c lo e lm l co##ontotlon of surface forcm, fo llo w lig the truism th #
wors could only be won by lond otmies. It was not until the ARCADIA m d Cmoblesioo conferences thot cleorly defined poi ic i# with reqsect to the opplic#ion
of olr pew# were flnotly enunciated*
’ ^ feid.
’ S id .
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told.
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YW ughwjt the yecHi of #q>eosement #W m tt-reodîig of the Hcœî threat,

the Briteh A k Staff remained attached to the p rW lp le of offense w h id i Trenchard
hod so eweh^Hy nurtured. Because the thrmd was mis-read. Hier® were few In
dividuals (outside o f the m ilitary) interested in challenging a strategic theory that

sounded plausible, even if it hod not been tested In war. When, In 1934, a sms#
o f j^o w iig dmger b^pm to gpip the British people, m mumemmu W tW need for

accelerated m il Itcry fw^rarotion grew «goce.
Faced w ith Hie tcek o f repairIrg over o decode of n ^ le c t, the competi
tion for rmources csnerg the Hiree services become acute. A new m d diorpened

Illumination was thrown upon the Air Staff doctrines when it becomo oppcrent that
the omnWry could build upon one p rW lp le —e ith # o#@rae or defenra— but not both.
The intelligence #tlm #es o f the Wrai^ph o f the Luftwaffe vls-o-vls the Royal Air
Force dicwed obi alarm lig numerical superiority on the Gmrmm side. Influmiced
by this knowledge, the decision wm mWe w ithin the Government to give priority
to defense.
Consequently, Bomb# Command entered the war uigropored lor the o fferaive tWc recommencbd by the A ir Staff. H) retrospect, howev#, the wioM n o f

the decision Is clear. The a W c # fwoé^ced for Fighter Commsmd (mid the radms
to guide them) provided the margin of victory In the Battle of Britain, granting to
Bonds# Ccmmmd Hi# precious time to build and train for the eventual omoult tpon
H !tl#*s Germany.

17

^^W #»ter and Frwiklond, I, 65-90.
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only wm Bomb# Gemmond deflclm t in #ews #W «îrcre^ # the
begiim lrg of the wor, but, od dltim olly, it found itself without on «greed m i#lon,
or ot l# o t o mission of the kind envisioned in the early 19^*s, After Î934 num
erous sëiem # had been drown up for the attack o f indu#rial cmters, ooamunlcatim s hdm, power systems, m d other m ilitary cd»|ectlv#. A ll

these plans suf

fer#! from the uncertainties dbrlving horn the lock of kmwledge of whm and whmre
the war wm to b ^ in , cmd how the memy would d e p l^ his strengths. Fwthermmre,
exploratory staff convemHions w ith the Franoh, when the war wm close at hand,
reveal#! the disquletirg expectation (to Bomber Commmd# that Hie entire bomber
force would be used m long roige a rtille ry In supgort of the French Ansiy*

IS

But even after the knpmtunlngs of the French had been disrcgarcbd, the
development of a picmsible tcrget system separate from the then con]e#ural tacti
cal kaW requiresmnts wm o d iftim ilt matter. The rarge I Imitât kms o f the atrmaft
In the Bomber Ccamnond squadrons estcèlldied on autonxitie sanctuary for those

German tmgets deemed w it# le for attack, but lying beyond the mmdmum radius
o f operotimw* The cm ollory to this problem, then, wm the «piestionable prudence
of striking half-blows # an enemy whose capacity to retal iate for wmeded the

attackers* a b ility to In flic t punishment. Afgreciatim i of this disturblrg reality
led Hie Govwrnmmit to mmounce on 21 A n# 19# that Britain was sensitive to the
eftect* of W iserW Inate bombing mid would, Hierefore, consider only the attende

and FrankloKi, I, 86-306.
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of mliltcBy ob|#ctlve$, and fhm wtfh due regerd f # ctvllkm eoxroîHe». The d e flnlflon of "Riiltfary objective*" wm mot supplied.

19

The wmr opened w ith hardly a glimmer o f how it would mnolude. The

main tmk for which Bomber Coaenand wa# than ëw ge d, be# equipped, and be#
p re y e d wa# Hie dropptig o f propcgemda leaflets over enemy tm ritory—at night
It was a time Intense ftu#ratian, dolehilly reflected in the @&##vatlm o f Sir
Arthur Harris to one of hi# close mmclates# "Ivo ry time you p m a lamp p©#, take
yow hot o ff, Waause if the war stmrt* serloWy the blame I# # lr g to be put on u#
fl
cmd that I# wh#e we dxsll flnW i, "
S ^ e n A # 1 ^ to May 1940 was tW period of the "fdiony" wm, w hl#i
fwovîded bm km Command the respite to p im , organize, and train the force for
the in finite ly greater eftW to follow . D uriig this the# Bomb# ComnwW sought
to oomm^o its f#ees, leaviig the initia tive to Ommmy* Attacks again# laW
tmge# were prcHi&ited, k it no r#trai#ts w #e imposW upon cperations «gain#
enemy naval vmaeli m d d iip p iig . Becosise attacks cgoln# su#% targebi required
fu ll vW b ility, the so rti# were ©enflned to Asylight hours. These early forays
proved to be oW ly bem #e the bmnbers, w ith their xsonty defemlve armament m d
relative disadvantage in speed, were ewy prey to Gennan fighters operating from
comtal a irfie ld # *^
^^Web#er and Fmnkkmd, I, 86-106*
% » W ., p p . 36-37.
21

Harris, op. c it* , p. 32.

^^eW er and fVarddmd, I, 192-1##
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N oM ltW ondüg the position of Infor tor Ity In which the B r it# found
thomsokos, the A ir Staff was oworo tW t if the Gomwms hroodenod the scope of
the wm by unrestricted bombing, by Invmlon o f the low Cotmh’los, or b # h , tfm
Royol A ir fmm would be forced to rwpond, mm ot the r # of severe loses* A coordlfgiy, a p lm was drown up for ottock of the Ruhr industriel complex# It wm

Q lucrotlve o rw w ithin rmge o f the bomb##, end moreover, there were w ithin it
terg#s such os #eel mill# end e ll r@ fln#l# tk # were se lf-il limaIno tt^# tW
re c f^ iz e d the ##em e vu ln e rtè lllty of their olrcreft during ^ y lig h t, the Bomb#

Gommond leaders were mm beginning to fmm nighttime operotlim#

21

On 10 May 1 9 # the Oermem» opmed the W #tern ofhsnsive* W ith the
sovcgn» bombing of RotterAm it wen InmedWely eppmrent that
W e#ion

hod m

following rmdrlctive bombing practices. The re o llm tlm of what wm

to come caused the British War Coblnet to authorize bombing attacks east of the
Rhine River. Thus k g m the strategic bombing offensive o g ^ W O erm c^—em
offensive which was to ecWlnue over the n W five years*

24

For the next two years Bonèer Goomond bed the unrewarding experiemoe
o f knowitg fu ll w ell w h # It wm ted to do, but without the whmrewlHiol to do it#
The ccmmond wm &f*c*#%t in sultdble aircraft m d trained crews, nav1g#ionol
techniques and eqpipmmt, commun1c#lcm gear, cmd effective oràiemce. At no
time, howevmr, did the A b Staff m BomAer Gommmd w av# from their convictIm
tkst the offense hod to be pursued unrelentingly# Signal succwse# were oWalmd

% w .

^ V id „ p. 144.
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m W k W raWs, but §m the most part the burden of the time were borne more by

the ipirît of the mmm thm by their occomplidvneifs* In recoiling ", , ,whot It
meant to go mf night after night from o dorkened field In tîncolrahîre into thot
cold Inferno over Germany, . . " Mczskil of the Royal A ir F#ce Sir AHin Steisor
lAserved thot. In general, the result# o f the mWlon* w # e poor and that **• # .the
crew# were sustained by the belief that

w #e hitting the enemy hard# then

they aetueliy were*
A fter the Ibilted State# entered into the war in DeWRAer, 1941, the
first aonferenoe of the new allies (4âCADIA) wm held in WmAington, On 22
December Prime M lfdst# Churchill w iv e d with m entourage of staff officer# cmd
other high-ranking o ftlc ia b . Rom then until 14 jcmuory 1942 the ccmf#ence met
w ith their American counterpcrt# to Icy the p l# n for the prosecution of the w w .
The confermce first detwnlned the way In w h lA the two countries would cooperate

militarily and, this bebg agreed, then set the braes of strategy for the ensuing
eftort,^^
O f the many dealsiom reoAed at the conference, the most important was
the determirmtion to place first emfHxnl# upcm the war cgolrat H itler, This wra by
no means a popular corae in America, but It was a str#egy that hod long been
advocated by mmy senior Army officers, Includlrg mo# of the Army A ir Forces*

^ jo h n Slessra, The C w trel # lu # Autoblp#G#hy of Sir john Sbster,
MonAoi o f the RAF 04ew'% rkr"l% sdkicl(% ^
<nd Cat#, I, 237-245.
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Among the sWtoglo w b -o b |e # iv# wm the reeff innoHrai o f the plm
to weoken Gmmmy by otr oHock, The Army A k fm em were to ^ in the Royol
A ir Fofoe In oonoeotroted ottaoki m soon ra sqwoéom# oovW be reodted f # deploymmt. Preliminary pire» set MorWi, 1942, os the dote when the first heavy
bmAradment graup# would # e # the AtlmmtW# These pirn# fo lW to oonslAwr expmded tro in lig requirements cmd the reotly draperie need f # erewi m i olraroft
in the Pcmiflo. When these fctctors were Introduce Into the fxtgrcsii, the buildup o f Anerlom bomb# fore # tn the Ikilted Kirg^kw was delayed for many mWh#^
orW the bond»# offmsive did not begin In idrm^th until a ft# the CwAlcmco eonf##nce of Jcmucary, 1943.
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When the high eommcsicb met ego in, this time In CeocAicmrai, the courra
of the w # hod b@#n to ekmge. The German offensive hod lo# % momentum as
a rmulf o f the dlsratrou# Russian oasqpolgn. Slowly the roles of the eombotonts
began to shift, the oggrrasort beoomimg the defenders, and vice v# ra . The p # pose o f the #H^#ence wra to reqxmd to this shift in inîticdîve and to plan the
A llie d strategy in lîÿ it o f the new develapmWs#^
Undei^innlig the strcHegy wra the unAokoble eraivlction thcd defeat
Germany would have to erase thrawgh land opraotkra* Hof o il of the oonfraees
egreed (e s# ^lo lly the airmen)/ but tksse who w #e the final arb1t#s prasWed in
their erthedexy and uneq»Ivoeaily wbordinoted the strategic bombir^ campaign to
^ Ib W .

A vA xM f md Frcnklond, II, 10-21.
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fho lnvatl<m of the Om tlnent. Thus the throo-prcMged plan developed at Craoblctnoa oalled

. .for sustaining the Rumlm armies in the fie ld , for m ilitary

operations of thek ^ e Allied? own m the Medltermnem flank ond for Intonsify iig the strategic bmnbing offensive c ^ lm t Gemony hw ralf. "
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Q uite clecrly, the olr offm sive was considered o delude to the ultimate
invraion. the Wq»#tance of the GbsAlmoo conference to the Strategic A ir
Offensive w # that it gave wnlfiW dkectldm Çiowever vqgus) t# the British and
American bocA# #>rc#, although each # ill c lu t^ stubbornly to its own W rcd^tc
co n e ^t and prefrared operational ta ct*# . W ithin the framework of a general
mi«?on stohm m t, o set of specific target priorities was prra#lbedi
W
#
(4
#
(e)

German submarine construction yarcb.
The German aircraft W u # y .
Tror^ortotlon.
O il pl#Hs.
Other targets In memy w # Indutnry.

The directive m Halning the priority list told the ok planners what to <k>, but not
how to do It. Because the document required l#erpre$atkm, the obvious occurred*
Each M ce put its mm înterj^etotM i upon the worAsge, which Hien become |%#lflcotlcm fo r dcxstrlnol rigidity* To the ^ trW e n t of the A IIW omise the division
of cginion p#sWed* Nor was the directive ever emended to the degree needed

to resolve the Issues*^
Viewed In retmspe#, the G m A lm cc directive to the s tr # ^ lc air ele
ments produced m u lts #m m m *#ate wlHi Its Intrinsic quality a t a # o ff docume#*
^8 > id .

% W .
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ftrah muW Have hmn eomiderobly kqxraved* It# meming to the enemy, howev#,
wos wnmAguera#
The s lg E iifl^ o e of tW Ceodbtorico Directive If# In the fpot A ct It scnght
to mém W W rW Im ## benAIng re###é4#:'##m em s of wegW# wor# W
the belief thot It promised to oxoroW o deoftlvo Influence on the
of Aewor* TbeoAole of Gomony wm om# dWemd o twget oreo.^*

^%umpf, ep . elt,# p* 60.

cH m m w
STRATIGYAND UNITY
Often mgood basic Idea su fim fmm the W W e to fellow It w ith e q io lly
good supporting W e#. A ease eon be mode thot this wra true of the Cemblmed
Bomber O ftm slve. Given the eraly persuralons o f both the British end Amerlram
ok ilo fts that WWegle b ra ^ lig wmild bo lnstr%mWol In the defect of Germmy,
it Is not w rp ris i# thot o unified slnioture oom#lslng bWh o f the bembradment
forces wra crecded. W W is le% uWraWméable Is th # the neoessory sub-Wfuetures
did not swolve which would hove mmh of the whole o thoroughly in h ^o te d ef
fort, from plcRutlig to racecution* Whatever may hove been the reraom fwr not
doing #0 at the time, today's pen^ective ram only su^gc# that subjcmtlvlty raid
pride were in prat to blame#
Follow tig the Craoblraica Confraenra # w h ië i the A llies endorsed the
ramcept of a oonAtned bonAer oftenslve, a period o f thee ekgsed wherebi both
the United Stcdes Am y A ir f^ ra s raid the R#ral A ir Force (to o ïm m mcteid) worked
out the plram iig details of the forthcomlig i^ e m o tic ratock upon Germany# The
pbn^ wra (^proved by tW Combined Chiefs o f Staff on IB May 1943 and followed
by o frame# direntIve of Wglementedion on 10 June 1943* The ^e ro tlra i wra
desipioted by the code name FOINTBLANK»^
^"Flrai fra the Combined Bomber Offensive from the IMIted Kirgdom ."
^Q tm m and Cote, IS, 34B and 631.
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B#cw*é Bomber Command was of meeemfty eemmlWed to might strikes
e#dmst «rea tcrgets, the task mf mf for Its oemm % FOINTWLANK was mot gyeatly

different from what they had bem doing, enee;# the* mm they wrae merely to shift
the loci of their attacW to compl#mmt the Amralcrai daylight mWlam. These d a y
light raids were to be eomdwated against selected military and Imdustrfol trageft,
raid In a (gee if led priority*

The targets described by the plrai hW berai cbraen by a

o f rasolyift

in the W rahti^on Headgicrters cH the United States Amy A k Forces* ConvenW

as the "Committee of Opetatlons Analysts** by Gemraal Hmry H* Ar##ld, Commandlng G ra ^ o l of the Army A ir Forces, the #oup sra^H fo define a syWem of
Nrgets thcd, If destroyed, would most wesAen Germraty In Hie sbrate# time. After

the oompletion of their work in MraWi o f 1943, the findings (which ciraely opproxiiimted the CasabNmca objectlvei) were *e # to the British M lnW ry o f icraiomîc

Worfore, the Royal Air Force, raid the ll ^ t h A k Force, then rammrawfod by
Lieutenant Graieraf Ira C. la ker. With only minor # m llflc # lo n the r# o rtw a s

enthusiastically received and generally accepted*^
If, as originally w ritten, the FOINfBLANK plan had been rig idly fol
lowed, it would have meant acaeptanee by Sk Arthur Harris of the prlnc^le of
selective «dtacks upon l# y industri#. The modlfiradkms In te m ln o k ^ requraded
by Harris, orW written Into the final version o f the plan, clearly IndlW ed that no

such transformation bad takrai place* He fosd, Wtead, opraied a

% W . , pp. 3 # -3 6 6 .

using
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conveniently ambiguous phraseology that permitted him to proceed more or less
unhindered along his own tack. There is reason to believe, and not unfairly,
that Harris and Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Charles Portal, Chief of A ir
Staff, were more interested in quickly developing a strong partner in the Eighth
A ir Force than they were in arguing the niceties of a target system bosed more upon
American estimates of capability than upon experience.^ In any event, both knew
that to oppose the plan would have strengthened tliose other service factions in the
United States who wished to lim it the allocation of resources to the bomber pro
gram.^
The structure framed for the conckjct of the Combined Bomber Offensive
was singularly informal* At TRIDENT, the Washington conference of May, 1943,
convened to implement the Casablanca decisions, the Combined Chiefr of Staff
stipulated that the Royal Air Force Chief of A ir Staff would be their agent in the
direction of the bomber offensive. In his 10 June 1943 directive to Harris and Eaker,
Portal re-phrased, but generally preserved, the specifics of the Combined Bomber
Offensive plan which had assigned the selective attack targets to the Eighth A ir
Force and reserved for Bomber Command its main task of disrupting German industry.

It should be noted, however, that Portal was a strong suj^jorter of the
American priority requirement to gain air superiority over the Luftwaffe. Harris
was less ardent, although he saw the odvontoge to Bomber Command wore air
superiority to be achieved.
Webster and Frank land, II, 17-21.
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acting, when priictlcdble. In a role complementary to Eokra'i forces. The {ob
of ironing out the necessary details wra le ft by Portal to the two commanders.^
A system of #»ef#lon#, Impraed from dsove, wra cleorly neWed. Evm
though the degpee of Integration of effort prescribed by the Combliwd Bomber
Offensive plan wra wotered-dtown by the Portal directive, o requirrament for close
coordinotion nom» the less existed. General Arnold, after o review o f the docu
ments, raked Sir Char Ira for the ratobllshment of some form of mochlnery thcH
would more closely interlace the activities of the two commands. Coraequently,
the ^m bined Operotlraml PIrainIng Conunlttee wra created. Unfortunately, the
committee wra o planning organ that hod no directive or executive authority. It
raxild only reconenend, ond because It concerned itself primarily w ith the daylight
tragets. It berasne o consultative body whose main benefit wra to act ra liolsrai
between Bomber Command raid the Eighth A ir Force.^
The net effect of the failure to superimpose cleor-m it direction over the
two forera wra to drive them along two praollel courses. "For the mo# port of 1943
there wra no combined offensive, but on the contrary, a bonA ii^ competition.**

S

Fundamentally, the sWotegic issue wra not the distinction between dby
and night bombing. Even if it hod been, both forces were by now too far raitrenched
through crew training raid aircraft selection to sAruptly chraige their ways of
^Craven cmd Cote, II, 373-374.
pp. 374-375.
^A/ebstar and Frank land, 11, 5.
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fighting* The reel issue was disagreement over the question cH selective or ge#^
e o l ottock. The Am#r$cra%s held that " it is better to craise o high dk^ee o f A tsW ction tn m few reolly essmtiol industrira then to couse e smell degpee of destruct ion in mony industries. "

This could be done by precision bombing of se

lected key indbstrlol plraits, by raeo bombli^ o f the cities wherein the Inebstries
were locoted# or by o cxsmbinotkm o f both. The Bomber Otmmond view (oceepted
w ith dim in idling enthuslram by the A ir Stoff o f the Royal A ir Force) wra thot g m erol bombii^ on a vest scale would groduolty# by cumulotive effect, destroy the
motor iol brae of Germcm inA#try cmd the morale of the people who wrae reqsontlb le for prockiction. Furthermore, It wra heW, ottocks ogoînst key Industries olrase
could be offset by dispersal ond stockpiling of critioot Items in areas unlikely to
come under attack.
There could be no doubt sAout the logical esdmsston o f the Bombra Com
mand view. Q uite simply, if permitted to proceed without sij^m nltqt-oft the
command's strength in side exmjrsions, Harris bel loved that he could preclude cm
invraion of the Continent.

11

With the flush o f success occralraied by his b rill iont

attcMcs upon Hamburg cmd the Ruhr he became more adonwnt in his belief# and
rolled ogolrat thrae who sought to divert hi# effmrtsi

^^Harris, op. c it. , p. Zm.

4Î

Hod I paid attention to the panooea-mongert who were eiwoys cropping
up and hawkii^ their wwe#, BooAer Command would hove flitte d
continually from one thing to «mother during the whole pmrlod of my
Command; the confjnutty of the offmurve m a whole emu Id hove brain
irretrievobiy lost.
On the American side there was an equally mulish rraistonce to change.
They, after a ll, had thrown down the glove In the Combined Bomber Offensive
p lc m -^ ith 0 scmty foundation of experience behind them (mratiy sorties «gainst
poorly-defended French targets or very A cllow penetrations Into Oermony). With
their insistent avowal o f their copcAility to penetrate the German heartland by day
and without fighter racort, the only course open was to attempt to prove what they
said they could do.
Lrasons wmre learned In both camps through the notorious operations con
creted against the boll-bew ing center—Sehweinfurt. From the American stoncfooint
the ro lA o f 17 August and 14 October 1943 sigpmlled the time o f acute ratsls. On
the first raid o loss rote of 19 per cent of the attacking frace was sustained; on the
second, 21 per cent. These losses wmre out of a ll proportlcm to the damage and
interference ccmsed w ithin A c ball-bearing Industry. Aftmr Ae first attack the
Germans quickly recognized the A llied Intent and moved proAictton facilities to
other areas. The sacraid attack wra, therefore, of little consequence because t
happened after the re-location had been accomplished.

^^Harris, op. c it. , p. 2 ^ .
^^Craven and Cote, II, 681-706.
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Entirely dlfferm t results
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wouM have prdaeAly been achieved if Ae Army A ir Forera oHock hod tokrai piece
on successive days* British follow-up sorties ot night would hove been of y e o t
rasistrmce, but the eoordlnotlon between Ae forera wos woefully deficient* The
E iÿith A ir Force picked Ae period of a foll-moon for the August rotd, a time when
dsviousty the Royal A ir Force could not diqxstch its bombers becouse o f A elr extrmne
vulnerability under those condltiom.
The Americraw were faced w ith o serious dilemma. On the one hand, A elr
losses were spproochlng o magnitude that mode continued cperctlons of doubtlbl
value. On the other hand, only by sustained operations could any tenting successes
be attained. There were determlndble limits to the loss rates that could be born by
the attackers in relation to Ae results the survivors could be expected to achieve,
it cq^eored that the limits hod been reached. The experlenraa of Schweinfurt unqurationobly influenced two of the conclusions of the United States Strategic Bomb
ing Survey;
The significance of fo il dominatirai of the air over the raiemy—Aoth
over its armed forces arW over Its sustaining economy—must be em|A<w^*3red.
That dcmtinction of the air was essential. W iAout it, attemks on the basic
economy of the enemy could not hove been cblivered in W ficie n t force
<md w ith sufficient freedbm to bring effective and Irating results.

The German experience showed that, whatever Ae target system, no
'ndispensible Incfostry was permanently put out of commission by a single

^^Webster and Fronklond, II, 62-63.
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attack. Frarsîstcnt re-attack wot necessary.
W iAîn the Royal A ir Force, A eir Schweinfurt incident wm m f one of
operational signifiom ce but Instead# a crisis In ovtW rlty. In December o f 1943
Sir Arthur Hccrls wrote to the A ir Ministry stating Act# w IA only his programmed
force of Lancaster bombers# he could make A c German surren<for InevitoAle by 1
A pril 1944. This presumed A ct the necessary priorities would be allocated for pro
duction and repolr of aircraft# and that he would be free from divraslonray fmrce
commitments imposed upon Bomber Command by external headquarters.
Although the position token by Harris reflected no amo than o very lltraol
reading of the Bomber Comnxxnd miraion traked in the FOINTBLANK directives# It
was not well-received by the A ir Staff for several reasons. (1) The opinion of the
A ir Staff was beglnnli^ to evidence growing doubts cAout the efficacy of general
attack#. (0 The Inefteetlvenesi of the Eighth A ir Force ago Inst selected targets
(the Luftwaffe# In portteulai) was becoming alarming. (3) The cHtocks on key indu#rira required massive concentration of effort, (4 Neutralization of the German
FiflAter Force was precomîîtiîwial to the success of OVERLORD (the Invasion of the
Continent).
For these reasons# and because Ae entire strategy of Ae ConAined Chiefs
of Stoft h l^ e d on OVERLORD# A ir Chief Marshal Sir Nramon Bottomley# Deputy

^

^^The United States Strategic Bombing Survey; Overall Reprat {European
(w asK % K hTT J3:
pp:
^Webster and Fronkiond, II# 53-72.
^^Ibld.
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Chief of A ir Stoff, wra forced to reply to HorrW In what amounted to an unequivocal
reversal of the Bomber Command strategy. Harris wra instructed to shift his attacks
to Ae selected tragets w ith the hope that what the Ilg h A A ir Force could not do In
daylight, Bombra Command m i|ÿit be able to do at night. Specifically, Harris wra
preraed to strike S^iwelnfurt because of the h îÿ i priority that B ritiA IntelHgmnce
placed upon the O m nm ball-bearing supply. The request wra m# hrawred. Sir
Arthur considered the attack to be a waste of time. Clearly, the contrat had reached
a state where the inaction of Ae Commcmder-in-Chief, Bomber Command, wra
verging on Insubordination. The m ithralty o f Portal ra Chief of A ir Staff was being
openly flaunted. Firm action wra required, not only to preserve discipline, but also
because Portal iwd come to fu ll ogreemrait w ith the American A ir Staff as to the
necessity for pursuing Ae detailed POINTBLANK objectives. On 14 Jonuray 1944
a directive was Issued to Hcrris ordering him to attack Schweinfurt until it wra de
stroyed. He continued to protest but his reasoning wra fla tly rejected. A ^ in , on
27 January, Portal's order wra repeated. As a consequence, but after s till more de»
lay, on Ae night of 24 Februray 1944 Bomber Command sent 734 bombers over
Schweinfurt. They followed o d o y llÿ it attack, on the some day, by 266 bombers of
the Eighth A ir Frace. The Combined Bomber Offonsîv® had fîmsily begun.
This emphrais upon Ae value o f selective attack correspraided
mrae closely to the aim which had Irapired the efforts of Ae E i^ th
A ir Force than to Ae policy which hod generally and prlmraily
governed the conduct of Bomber Cofwnemd since Ae stmimer of 1941.
Yet it wra undoubtedly the ^qporent failure of the Eighth A ir Force,

’ «Ibid.
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cutmlnaHng m the Schw©liifurt dlsosfer of OcfoWr 1943, which had
pmduW i m ii #hi#. The confîmiiiig growth of the 0 e m m fiÿ ite r
fwce and #%e evident failure of the Eighth A ir Force to check it
coupled w ith the ^iprooch of O v^lord and the ov#whel#ing need
for air s u ^ io rity , had virtua lly l<Sced the A ir Staff Into what
cmomted to a policy of ddperatlon* In fh lt eituotlon, Sir Arthur
Harris* wgwnent for the general area assault had appeared to be
mot W y extravagant W t also irrelevant, ^
A ftw this harrowing year (194%, die forturm of both forces in^oved,
Bomber OmmmW <xx|ulred the technirÿues that pemiitted it to

pxecision

might bondslmg, and the Eighth A ir Force began to receive In quantity the bmg*r w ^ fighters so v ita lly needed for escort duty, A d d itim o lly, the American forces
were itrm ^lhened by the creation, on 1 Jmnumy 1944, o f the United States Strategic
A ir Forcm In Europe, a command comprising tfm Eighth A ir Force emd Hie newly
in s titu te d Fl^eemth A ir Fwce in Ita ly, The Combined Bomb# O^ensive, vitalised
by nsw and explicit directives, began to achieve the rewlts that hod eluded Its
pirmmers since its formation. But w ith the approach of OVERLORD, on orgonixotlonai
problem of greet m c^itude <^>pe#ed«
W heth# or not the personal opinions o f Sir Arthur Harris (now {olned by
the Commmding Oemsrol, United States Strategic AW Forces in Europe, Gen#al
Carl A, Spootz) w #e coirect'-^thot the right kind o f m air o ffm iv e could stove
o ff the need for inveeion—the course of the war now depended upon the successful
ctxickict of OVERLŒD, It was w ith this imp#ot*ve before them that the C offined
Chiefs of Staff weighed every decision. And wheth# or not therewas complete
accord among the principals, the decision had been mode to me the strategic oir
elem#iH in support of the invoston. This had the eoncomltemt effect of suspending
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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the original bombing proprom of the Combined Bomber Offesnive, at least until a
secure foothold hod been gained by the liwceion forces. The question of who was
going to commwd the bombers under this new concept became oti Issue charged
w ith comideroble emotion.
Prior to this time the control of Bomb# C^rwcmd and the United States
Strategic A ir Fore# In Europe was vwted in the Combined Chiefs of Staff through
the Ro)ml A ir Force Chief of A ir Staff as their agerd. General Dwight D# Elsen*
hower. Supreme Commmder, A llie d Expeditionary Fmrc#, was sim ilarly r#ponslbl#
only to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, and since he was to employ the strategic air
forces in OVERLORD he believed strm gly that he should #@mmand them.
My inslstmce upon commarHJi^ these air forces at that time wca
further influenced by the lesson so conclusively demonstrated at Salerno;
when a battle needs the last ounce of available force, the oocmmnder
must not be in the position of depending upon request and negotlatkm
to get it, it W€0 v ita l that the entire mm of our cesoult power, including
the two Strategic A ir F#ces, be available for use during the critica l
stcges of the attack, I stcded unequivocally that so long os I was in
command I would accept no other solution, although I ogpeed that the
two commmders of the heavy bombing forces would not be subordinated
to my Tactical Air commander In chief but would receive orders directly
from me,^
The American O ilefs of Staff did not object to Eisenhower's demand because
the proposal was In line w ith their idem of achieving command of the entire opera*
^Forrest C. P « ^e , The Supreme Command^ V ol. IV; The European Theater
of OperotioM, United States Army in World War II, ed, K w t Robes^''(ÿreenïiel¥
~
Washington* Ü.É G o v e rr^ n t P rw lh g ' Office','
, pp. 123*137,
2Î

Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade In Europe (N#v Yorks Doubleday &
Compcmy, In c ,, 194#, p. 222.
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tîo ii. The British, however, were vîrtuolly umonlmou* In their opposition to the
fi^reement. ^ id e from perhaps purely notional oomiderotlims, the primwy fecr
wm that Bomb# Commsmd's ottook upon German incbstry would be wmpromlsed
and that the whole weight of the force would be Frittered owoy on unworthy targets
In xipport of the Im d battle.
Both the British imd Americans were opp*%ed to the oltemote plan whereby
the elements o f the UnltW States Strategic A ir Forces In Ewope and Bomb# Commmd
detached f # the supp#t of OVERLORD would come und# A ir Marshal Sir Troff#d
Leigh*Motlory, the newly appointed Ccmmond#*ln*Chlef, A llied Expeditionary
A ir F#ce, and a sub#dinate of glsenhow#, Lelg^*Molfory wm o distinguished
fig h t# p ilo t who had led the Fight# Command, but to Harris and Spoatz, the Idea
o f placing bomb# units und# o tactical command# was unthinkable.

23

Eismhow# was not to be put o ff. A ff# fruitful dbcutsiom wlHi Sir Ch#les
Portal and Prime M in lst# C hw chill, he evolved a conqpromise solution to the pro
blem that seemed both logical w d fa ir. The tactical f#ees would remain und#
Letgh-M ollory, but the strategic fore# would come und# Eisenhcw# through his
Deputy Supreme Command#, A ir Chief M ordwll Sir Arthur Tedd#. This would ovoid
p la c if^ Harris and Spootz und# on espol and would m #ely s%4%titute llsenhow#
for Portal os ag#it f # the Combined O iie fi of Stc#f. In effect, Tedd# would become
the Stqsreme Air Com m on^. As a pM#natlc solution the #rmgement mm excellent,
--------------- S
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and Fremklond, III, 10-41*

48

but In tromlotlng the agreed policy Into direct Iv# form, @protroctod semontle
battle arose o v# the nature o f |isenhow #'i auth# ity. The Brittdi ^o#e “super
vision,** but the Americms insisted upon "cmmmmd,** The Supreme Commander lost
potim ce and dmnmded clarification from the Combined ChieFi of Staff, saying
that

, . unless the matter Is settled at once I w ill requmst re lie f from this com

mand, " At this point the word “ direction** was introduced cmd occiqsted. On 14
24
April 1944 the outh#ity was pow d from Portal to glsenhow#*
The success# of the strategic air fwces In their s%#port of OVERLORD need
no elaboration. Tim w o rkli^ orror^cment proved to be eminently p ro c tlW , In
fa # , neither Siqprmne Headqucrt#s A llie d Expedltlonwy Forces nor either of the
two bond»# forces sought to t#mlnote the structure after the affairs on the Confine#
were w ell In h#»d. The British A ir Staff, howmf#, desired a return to the original
orrongement wherein the pow# &f dIrectI#* r#lded w ith the Comblmd Chiehi of
Staff. The motivation wen c le # , P#fal Wtimted to again ex#cise control ©v#
Bomb# Commcmd, The m ov#lck Harris needed, In the e y# of his w p#iors, the
r#traints achievable Hwough direct llwm o f command#
Although Eiserbower tWugbt the rev#slon to be awkward mid Inefflcent,
he diplomatically raised no ob|ection o ff# the Combined Chiefs of Staff inserted
a clause In the implementir^ directive **. . .which gave the demancb of the suprmne
in Europe p riw ity o v# a n y th in else that the s#ot<^lc bonbers might be

log# c it.
^Orovem and Co»., Ill, 320-322.
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required to do.
With the formal opproval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff on 14 September
1944 the control of the Combined Bomber Offeniive again possed to Portal. Instead
of solving the internal Royal A ir Force problems, the transfer only made things worse*
The differences between Portal and Harris persisted until the end of the war, growing
progressively worse as time passed. There was a time when it appeared that either
Portal would have to change his ideas or enforce them--which would mean dixnissing Harris. The matter was never resolved, probably because the cure would hcwe
been more distasteful thon the sickness. Thus the war ccsne to its final stages with
scarcely more cohesion in the strategic bombing policies than was present at the
start. In British circles there is strong sentiment that the post-invasion phose of
the war was avoidably prolonged by this tragic failure of accommixkition,^^

^^isenhower, op. c it . , p. 307.
^^Webster and Franklond, III, 75-94,

CHAPTav
BOMBING STRATEGY AND ETHICS
Not until new the end of the wor did British m d Ammrloon view* on generol bombing cqjproooh ony deyee of #mverg@nce, m d then only fleetImgly* B#h
govemmmts, from the begiming of the war, «btcried wontm attacks upon civillw w ,
but they differed In the proetiool (p lic a tio n of their common sensitivity. The Ameriearn ocbered to dgyli@f#t ottcmks with o rig id ity that, for a long period of tim e, wm
almost self-b»feoting. RaHier than con^romise their u n w illir# w * to strike other
than m ilitw y twgets (In a strict seme), they grimly o cci^e d loss rotes that were
nothing short of oHmtrophlc. The B ritld i, on the other hand, held to o broader
understanding o f what constituted a m ilitary target emd accepted the realization
that some civilia n cm uo lti# would inevitcbly be su#oined by the enemy If the war
w #e to be brought to on end at the ewi lest possible time.
That Hiere should hove been less reluctimce In Inglcmd to area bombing
than in the IM ifed States is not at a ll surprlsi#^. The blom struck against London
during the last half of 1940 were ample proof that the Germcms IW obonfkmed any
fxetense of lim itU ^ their attocW to purely m ilitary obfectiv#. The (W ire for re
taliation was widespread, W lu d ir^ mnoi^ its advocate# the Prime M in lst# himself.
In a minute to General lamoy on 19 Novmnber 1940 he said*
I wish to know. , .w h# i# the Worst form of f»op#tlonate retalî#îon,
i.e ., o y g l retaliation, that we con inff let upon ordtnmry German cities
for e ^ t mey mm now cteing to us by means of the peeochute mine. Todoy
we were infomsed that thirty-six hod been chopped, but by Wmrmw it
50
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may be a hundred* W ell, let it be e hundred end make the best possible
plan m that scale for action w ithin, say, a week or ten «feq^s. If we hove
to west long#, so be it, but moke sure there is no obstruction.
Nevmtheiess, even w ith the backing of Churchill, th#e wc» resistonce
to the action. As he commented in his ae^unt of the periods “A month later, I
was s till pressing for retaliation; but one objection after another, moral and techni
cal, obstructed it,
Not having hod the trying experiences of England to serve os o policy in
fluence, the Am erica#, when they entered the war, followed o bombing philosophy
similar to one expressed In a book written in 1941 by Arnold and laker.

3

In what

was a curious mixture of naivete and hard-headed realism the author said;
A large air force w ill not require a ll of its bombers for operotiom
c ^ in s t the air force of the enemy, P##istent attacks w ill be launched
immediately on those manufacturing establishments, power plants, m é
I in # of coRKnuntc#ion which are v ita l to an enemy In its attempt to
gird hself for war. Every factory in m enemy territory which is prockicing a vita l wm materiel or cm essential item of ecpipment, con ex
pect enmny air rotcb.

There has been much discussim cèout attacks on centers of p e l
let ion. It is generally occepted that bombing attacks on c iv il populace
mre uneconomical mid unwise. Many of the reports In the premnf war
in Europe of attacks on c iv il populations either ore propogcmda or due
to mistokm identity, or inaccuracy on the pcet of the bombardier in
the plane. Dome populatiom which reside in the v ic in ity of indus
tria l orw s, airdromes, navy yards and docks w ill undoubtedly feel
the effects of poor bombing on those ckicks. If either of the com1
Churchill, op. c it . , pp* 364-365.
^feid.
3
Then m oj# genwol and co l# ie l, re#ectively.
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bcihxiti has engc^red in attacks cm people, such missions coimot be c lm ifie d
other than ce decided tactical errors# The most economical way of recbcing
o large city to Hie point of surrender, o f breaking its w ill to resistance, is
not to é r ^ bombs in its streets, but to destroy the paw# plants which itqqtly
ligh t, the water supply, the sew# lines. N e v# , to cbite, and p # h c ^ In
no time, w ill m y nation hove a su ffle i# it air force to be cèle to w# it on
other thon p rlw ity tcegets. Hum## beings # e not priority t#gets except
in G#tain qscciot situations* Bombers In f# l# g # numb#s than # e avail
able today w ill be re tire d for wiping out people in sufficient numb## to
break the w ill o f o whole n o tim .^
| # l i # in the book, two in^p#t@nt recmon# w #e cited for the failure of the
IMited S lot# to be pregMsred for ofWwive bcmbi#^ op#atiom * The first was that
offense contravened notional policy, w hidi centered upon defense. The second wm
that th#e were unpleasant c h # a c t# lftl# msociotW with bomb# o p # # i# ts* The
pomtbilities of the involvement of non-combatants ##d non-m ilit#y ob|e#*ve# was
r^ugnant to the United States.

5

T h ro u ^ u t most of the w # the Am#icon# and the British retained their
d lff# in g ottitiK W tow#d bombing, although in proctice the Am#ic#% c ^ o tlo w
w #e often indistinguishable in results from the # of the British* D i^ ite their opposite
views, each w w r#trained to a degree by ethical #xwid#otions, some more genuliw
than others, h it th#e is no doubt that the w ln n lf^ of the w # was, for eodi, the end
obfective to which o il o th # cons!d#ations w #e seoondmy.
During the twenty yews that hove gone by since the collapse o f 0 # m # iy ,

H. Arnold and Ira C. Eok#, Winged W #fdre #4ew Y # k ; Hons# &
Broth#*, 1941), pp. 133-134.
^ Ib ld ., pp. 8-9.
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mm of the

pw slilentiy

that has bedevil#! the m lliW y em iy#

he# been Ibet of tW right##### or w re i^ e s i of the ge#wml WWsleg ef Gemm# eitles.
A review of this queet e# Wof ii^erest today beoeuse Hie l#ue I# eeetrelly InvWvW
In eentemperery debote over mlUtory strotegy—omd new, o# then, the meroi Issue I#
highly reievont, lo t be&re tun ing to m ##oifW «ose history $» old In wnèWondWg
the p t^ e m , three prelWWory Wk#erv#lon# dwwW be mode#
The first I# tW , d$#^^d*ng the fW tW the Gmmoni storW the wor, the
oulpWblllty far unrestrleted bombing «on be e ^ lt y # W h # d to three o f the flim mohtr
€afldbel(mti--0#Nrim»iiy, Great Britoin and the United Sfsdes* A ll three w^toged it»
ore# b o rà li^ wh#» it suited Ifieir Werest#, in spite of o fficia l poiWy sWements to
the eanlrory, And It is assuredly true that hod Japm and Rustle be#» #p#lpped wlHi
elromft w ltobl# far lon#-rong* ^ e re tim s , thsy too would hove den# so. The f t #
seem to hove bem that e b s trw or mwel eensldmsthms w # e d # n lt* ly lees of o
restraint tbm were qperatWnol «%fom#ana«s# In brW , Wwm It was apersdkmally
lid ^ lb S e to do preeislon bwdbl#^, m m bonéilf^ was the only altenW lve short W no
b W tin g at a ll.
The seemW poW deserving of mention Is that the Allied bombing pollsq^ was
fmt 0 poHoy b id deem by m ilitary men, but by their goverrmwts. A t the Omabtonea
sonfermee of 19# It hod been stlpulohsd tW the two tifsdm io olr fare #, wodilng
n e th e r, dmuld oebieve “ die p ro # m lve destruotktn end dlsleesdlon of the 0 e m m
m ilitary, W u # W l end eeonamla system and the undeseslning o f Hm morale W the
German pm ^le to the poW where their oopcmlty far armed rraWonoe Is W e lly
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#eokm#d.

Tbit

required end received the epprevcl e f FmHdent

Roosevelt and Prme Minister C h u rc h illW ith guidance of this kind, the leaders
of Bomber Command and the United States Strategic A ir Forces had # p l* c it strc^eglc
direction and, at the some time, wide latitude w ithin which to choose both their
targets and ta ct*# .
The lost factor to be brought to fore is the often shadowy distinction between
area m d precision bombing. Certainly one useful criterlw» to shwpm this distinction
could be that of intent. Tdcen clone, however, dependence upon this #%e criterion
could be misleading. While the aiming point of o given striking force may have been
associated w ith an identlfieble and precise point of geogro{Hiy, the results of the mis
sion could in no real sense be predicated upon the chceacter of the ob|(Kt#ve, and
this for three reasons. (1) The probability of adverse weatlier obscuring the target,
totally or port lo lly , decreased the assurance of precision bombing by a factor directly
proportional to the extent of the cloud cover. (2) Bombing accuracy under combat
conditiom did not approach the accuracy inherent in the bombing equipment and
attainable In o training environment.

(3) The location of the target was important.

If, for instance, on aiming point wm a marshalling ywd in the middle of a built-up
résidentiel créa, tne selection of that particular aiming point could, without undue
^Quoted In Webster cmd Franklond, II, 23.
^Ibid.
The Eighth A ir Force used a plonnti^ circular error o f 1000 feet for com
bat bombing altitudes over ^ ,0 0 0 feet and under visual sighting condltiom. (The
Army A h Forces, Tab C to Air War Flsoytiiy Document 42, 9 Sep 42, on file in the
ÜSAF Historical ArchSveiT^fl^'m^elI '
A l o l x m a '"fha average circular err#
for blind b o n è ii^ was oppnmimotely two miles. (Crovm and Cate, III, 723.) Com
pare those figures with the results of a simulated combat mission flown by the auth#
during training. (See Appendix 2.) The circular error for that pw tlcuW mission—
152 feet—was generally representative of the accuracy achieved by student bombar
diers (Wring traini#% mid prior to joining operational units.
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cynicism, be eomidered @euphemism h r somewhat Wooder effectives.
With these Idem serving m m introduction, a greater appreciation of the
issue con be gained by examining one pcrticulor operation that hw aroused fee lin g
and exjfxe^ions of umisuol depth*
On 13 Februmry 1945 three raids—two British cmd one Amerio®»—destroyed
the ancient c ity of Dresden, The most retîcèle estimates have placed the number of
fatalities rew lting from the attack at 135,OCKh—almost twice os many deaths at hove
been attributed to the edomic attack on Hiroshima.^
White slaughter of such magnitude d e fi# Imcginatlon, the estimate of
casualties is in a sense statistical <md of lesser imporWnce them the question of
whether or not the < ^ tfis , whotev# their number, were necessary at a ll. In the
opinion of David Irving, they were not. In a highly Interpretive book that if,
nevertheless, based up## nwticulous research, he concluded thcd, at the time of
the attack, tlw strategic in^ortanee of Dresden was “s#srcely morgirmi. “ Not only
was the city undeffmded (a fact not em ily cocmrtoineèle by the Allies) and free o f
major lndu#ry, but the war had progressed to a point In time where any city that
had not, by then, acquired strategic signlficcmee wm unlikely to do so in the
future.

^Davld Irving, The Destruction of Dresden (New Yorks H olt, Rinehart
and WImton, 196%, p. 216,
’ ^ Ib id ., pp. 69-77.
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Such apeculotW , heavily weighted w ith the wisdom of hInAlght, ccm
do no more th®i to threw o reminding gW e i^»on the tragic noture of w w Itself—
nor is It suggested hmre that Irv ii^ has Intended to do more then that. If the holo
caust of Dresckn Is c # t os o ghostly m*#ake. Hie lesson Is for today and tomorrow.
No just purpose wmitd be served by trying to find o scap#$^»at. (|M#aIses of that
nature ore oftm welcome because they provide a subconsolous avenue far the
sheddli^ o f on # own diore of the rmlleetlve g u ilt.) Thirqp known today could not
hove been known then, and dectsioiw mode In the time of war cannot be analyzed
today e x c ^ t w ithin on understcsKlif^ of the psychological matrix that surroimded
their making.
The reosom f # Dresden ere not to be found In cram Im ensltlvlty to hwnsm
«offering, nor, most certainly, in calculated savagery. Instead, if historical re
cords reflect the truth, the attack wm an event whose occursmce ccm be traced to
I u ltim a te m ilitm y db|e€tiv«e.
Early in 1945 a sense o f dlscourogemeW pervorWd the headqumters o f the
United Stotm Strategic A ir Forcm in Eiwope. The strategic offensive had been in
terrupted for a month stmting in the middle

December, 1944, so that the bonèers

could render tactical mslstmce to the beles#*#ed ground fmrces in the Ardennes.
Even though tW t operation, the Battle of the Bulge, had had o favorable conclusion,
freeing the bombers for return to their primary duties, the end of the wm was not
yet in sight. The month of rmplte hod allowed ttie Germcm o il industry to produce
sufficient & el for the Luftwaffe fa operate its deadly jet fighters w ith wnslderoble
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effectIveneit* Aftd o f no soloce wm o letter sent from Owierol 4moW to Generot
Spootz which echoed from the homehont the some pessimlwn thot wot b u lld ii^
within the theoter.

II

The letter rood In port;

We hove & superiority of ot lemf 5 to 1 now c ^ ln s t Germony and yet.
In # ite of o il our hopes, ontlcipotions, éreoms end plom, we hove os yet
not been daje to capitalize to the extent which we should* We may not
be cèle to Farce cc^itulotl#» of the Germom by oir cdtocl», but on è e
other hand, w ith this tremendous strikiiqi power, it would seem to me that
we èoutd get much better cmd much more decisive results them we mm
g e ttif^ now. I cm not criticizing, because frankly I don't know the
omwer end w h# I am now doing Is letting my thoughts run w ild w ith the
hope that out of this you may get o glimmer, o ligh t, o new th o u ^ t, or
something whicè w ill help us to bri*% this wear to a close racmer.
Faced w ith Hits situation, a reepproisol of the strategic target system hod
to be undertaken. A rev trad set of priorities was developed by Gmrarol %oat% and
A ir Morshot Bottomley In Jomiory, 1 9 # , but there was little #mre to the revision
them minor chcmges in emphrais# OH s till headed the list, followed by lines of
cofmnunicotlon, and, for the Royal A ir Force, blind attacks e##inst InckiWriol
®eos.^^
A signiflramt developmmt come ot the end o f the monHt when the Combined
Chiefs of Staff met at Motto prior to the YolW ommference. There the m ilitory chief»
decided to d iift the strrdegic ottock to the east in order to pravmt German reinforce
ment of the ropidly deterioroting fr##t. Additionally, they f#<èobly m ticlpoted
thot the Russians w w ld solicit such support at the FeWuory conference. The o ffm -

^^Crov#» <md Cate, III, 715.
p. 716.

, pp. 717-722.
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$iv0 we» to bo W nëiod agolmt tbora frcmtportatlon contori thot loy othwwt the
woitmt» qpprooohe* to the Ec^om Fmnt. A coroHory benefit to be goined was the
oreotion o f panic and concision in the cities thot would hopefully put strong pres
sure upon H itler to end the wor. Dr#den was one of the oM»oi#ed cities.
Reo#ion w ithin Germany to the Dresden ottock was stridently bitter.
Goebbet's |Mrop(^|e»ida mochine drogged out of the disaster evwry cmiceivoble odvontc#®. The common theme In o il o f Hie broodcwts to the outside world, both
from the stcdions inside Germany csid from those c lc m ^ tin e stotlom outside of the
country, w # the occus#lon of terror tactics.
Soon the prewes of the neutrol muntries were reporting detailed verslom
o f whot hod happened In Drraden.

But of greater Importance were the reactions

w ithin the United Stotes md Great Britain. In Hm United States the Secretary of
W® hod to be briefed concerning the strotegic signlflwnce o f Dresdm ond of the
desire of the ftussicms to hove It neutrolized. And o g^eot flurry o f telegrams went
bock emd forth between Wodilngton ond Hie hewlqmsrters o f the United States Stra
tegic A ir Fmrces mktng for aiwl receiving ossuronc# th # only c lo v e d bombing
tactics w®e beiiqi employed.
In Greet Britain the reaction, though deloyed, wo# severe. The days
fo lio w ii^ Dresden sew m upswing In the fortunes of the A llies. The prasimism
H b id ., pp. 724-731.
Irving, op. ,U . , p. 222.
end Cede, III, 731.
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thot hod cqspeored offer the Bottle of the Bulge turned to rp le t (^ tlm lm . The o il
offereive oonduoted by the United Stotes Strotegic A ir F#ces cmd, reluctantly, by
Sir ^ h u r Hearts hegm to produce the desired results, ond the Icaid forces swept on
towwd Berlin cmd the ecnt. A ll o f these th ir ^ ccxnbined to rotse doubts in the mind
o f the Prime Minister os to the need for Farther strategic oir opwotiom, ond in
penrticul®, heovy generot bombing. Accordingly, on 28 Mwch 1945 he pn^iored
the following minute for the Chiefs of Stoff Committee ond the Chief of A ir Strrff*
it seems to me thot the moment h # come when the gestion of bomblr%
of Germon cities simply for the soke o f inweoslng the tm rcr, though under
other pretexts# èould be reviewed. Otherwise we shall come into control
of m utterly ruined land. We shell not, for Instance, be able to get housii^ materials out o f Germany far our own needs because some temporary
provision would hove to be ma#W far the Germom themselv#» The destruc
tion o f Dresden remoins a serious query ogatiwt the #>nduct o f A IIW bombtr^ , I am o f the opinion that m ilitary dbjectîves must hencefwth be more
strictly studied In our own interests rather than that of the enemy.
The Fmrei^ Secretary hm spoken to me on this sub{eet, ®id I feel the
need far more precise cxmcmnftotion upon m ilitary objectives, sucé os o il
and communications behind the immedicde bottle-zcme, rather than on
mere acts o f terror and want#» destruction, however impressive.
AlHiough the underlying motive of the #xnmun leaf ion was without doubt
proper, the manner of its fdirasing w w a cruel cmd unwcnrrcnited thrust at the Royal
A ir Force. In his unveiled oritieism o f Dresden, Churchill totally ignored the fact
that on 26 Jonucyy 1945 he had d i^ të ie d on umswolly curt minute to the Secretwy
of ^o te far A ir, Sir Archibald Sinclair, demcmdlng to know when Berlin and "^h e r
l®ge cities in East Germany** w #e to be brought under attack. Not only was Hie
ottriW tion of blame for the ïkm dm attack unfair, but it constituted a Wood in
dictment of the bonèing policy which the govwnment had consistently approved far
^^W eb#®'md Rw klond,' 'I

I

I

" "" " '
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Hie mmy yeon o f Bomb# Commond's operation# over Gemony. When the Prime
MlnWer received wmd o f Hie dtslrett hi# mlmite hod oooosloned w ithin Bomber
CormwaW, it h to his eredlt thot he owised it to be withdrown in favor of one more
felleltom iy worded#
O f the memy ottltude# and c^inlora oonc#ned w ith the ethloot oqteets of
general bombardment, m é \ of the cH^flolol hist®lee of the Stratégie A ir Offensive
mntain# a prasoge that seems, for Its own service, to capture what was both the
essmce and the reality o f Its country's belieff# These bear repetition.
First, from the Americcm hlstmyi
In General Spaatz's mind, “beating up the insides of G#mcmy“ meant
m more Him the Intenslflcotim o f a well-om celvod program o f HW eglc
bombwdmmt, but thmre wen no diorF%e o f propwols ffont ® h # sources for
qpeclol emqaloym## of the ov#wh@lmlr% air pew# at the di^osol of the
A llie d commtW. Some of Hie propraols were BrItiHi In w lg ln orW some
wmm American, m d some of them tmded to beconm on Imue between the
AAF and the RAF* Especially wm this true o f proposals to bomb Germany
so tm rlfylngly H # it would we for peace. . . .A ll proposals ffonkly aimed
ot breaking the mmole o f the Germcm people met the comWent opposition
of G en#ai Spcmtz, who r^aeotedly raised the moral Wsue Involved, cmd
AAF Head^tcarteri In Wcohli^ton strongly s*q»ported him on the ground#
that suëi qperatiom were eontiwy to a ir force policy and national Ideals.
On more tlmm one occasion ElsmAow# backed Spootz's Insistence thot
his own forera be sent only against what he mmsl<W«d legitimate m ilitary
ta rg e t. At t lim , SHAIF yIelcM to other premures.
Second, §mm the B r it# history:
The conckict of the #rat@glc air offensive had long been re d d e d w ith
smplcion by sections of public opinion In Britain. It was generally regarded
as morally l^ itlm a te to hcmh s tra t^ lc <è|ectîv«s such os factories, o il

% W ., pp. 95-119.
^^Croven and C o t., Ill, 638.
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plrnitf, éùekyméi and railway e##r@#, even if $hW did Incldently iwufe
severe destruction of residentIql oreos #W of civilian life mé I I # * On
the other hand, the view tfmt it was m ®ally legitimate to bomb residen
tia l area, even If the ob|ect wm to recbce m ilitary m industrial a c tivity,
wm frmpmntly ch o llen s#, and the more sppmrent It became that in the
m a ^ lty of its major m m ottadd. Bomber Ommond wm, In fact, oWing
at the c m tr# of the residential areas, the more prmounced the protests
became. In dealing w ith these chal1e%# and w ith the many motions ##quirlee which he received, the $##et®y o f State for A ir was naturally
placed in a sram vh# dbf ic# e and d iffic u lt pralfism* It wee imFsrtimote
that he had to contend with such o widespreW m d d e ^ro o te d i^mremce
of the opm ttlm ol problems InvolvW* A ll the some, many of thcee who
exprrased anxiety sèmit the objects of strategic bombim were highly retponslWe people whose motives could w t be In doubt. ^

M a b o lm w to these vlmm, a stnmge but sobering #%^Wion 1$ to be
found In a post-w® book written by a man who wra the Inqaector 0 e n # a l of Fire
Prevention In Germany. Quoting a french m llltm y writer, he mwrW a relotionèïp
between the Nuremberg trials and the bonèïng of Germany:
The brais of the proce» wra settle in advance: the enemy hod to be
wrong* The sight of the vast ruins IW thrown the victors into a p w ic ,
cmd they were afraid* The enemy had to be w f® ^—think of what the
world would look like if he were not I How intolercèly heavy the leaden
weight ^ conscience would rest cm us for a ll thora towra we remed to the
groundl^
Aprat From forcing a real izatlm of the utter uselessness of modem wcrfra®,
the DrW en episode tells another story, one that speaks more to the future than to
the prat. It is simply this. When one r^ords the tenrWe devastation of Drraden,
the thought Immediately occurs that the pattern could have been repeated through-

^%^daster cmd Frcmklcmd, III, 114*
21

Hans Rurqpf, The Bcmblim of Genecny, trons. Idwrad Fitzgerald
(New Yrak# H olt, R iW w f ohd'W hwiK '
225*
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out Grammy. If H%#A m trlcm m d fc rit# forms Hod oo#inod—oorly In th#
to i^ e m o tlo o lly do#roy ooeh Gormm c ity of over 100,000 W wèltmW , thrae I#
little evldmee to

thot it oowld not Hove been done. WHetHra or not tW

course of octîon would hove led to m eorller victory Is open to con|e#ure. Whot
if wpremely W ^ortW , Ixqrond sterile # e e u l# W ebout ed i# might hove h*q»pened,
is th # the A llies deltberefely # o *e not to fu lfill their potradlol o f de#ructlm .
Their choim wos m boon to humonlty.

CHAPTIR VI
MEN AND MACHINES
During the period between th© end of W ®ld W® I and the begînnii^ of
World W® II, the c ^ iio o tio n of teehnolcgy to the soîenoe of worfdr© wra not o
popul® occupation. Stultified by their obsession with th© doctrines of the prat,
th© m illtcry leaders of Ae period foiled to put to use th© techniques raid odvraicra
mode by their scientific contemporrarles. ^ The wcr began w ith wecqram that were,
relatively speaking, hardly odvonced at o il from tWcraicludIng days of Wrald W® I#
In Great Britain, ckqslt© the Wiowle<%e that H ltl# wra reramIng # an
alarming pace, there wra widespread and rbeam-llke uncemcern. Late In July,
1936, Winston Churchill fe lt obliged to warn the government that m emergency
existed. He estimated that at least two years would ©Icpse before the procbction
of ormranents could reach minimally occeptcèl® figures—and even then the stocks
would be hopelessly è o rt of war-time needb.^
Across the orarai th© situatlcm wra worse* When Franklin D, Roosevelt
took office In 1933, the United States Army ranked seventeenth among those of the
world. Isolationist smtlment dranlnated the notlrawl mood and the sow rlty of the

^When Sir Arthur Hrarls attended the Royal Army Staff 0»llege In 19S^
he wra qppolied by its conservatism.
. .The n^tfo of the piw e wra 'be ortWdox
or praish*; and being rathodox w M ored to mean W d ii^ on to evray traiet o f wrafor© tW hral turned out to be a busted flush between 1914 cmd 1918 raid lgnralr%
a ll subsequmt teduiicol ckwelopment.** frtrarls, op. c it., pp. 24-25.)

^Churchill, I, 681-687.
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Iw d wra

lo the bug gum o f the novy.^
Each country b # , however, profltted to o degree From the experienora

o f World Wor I ond hod given some attention to the place of air power in future
wor$. Urxbrstandeèly, the Interest wra grradW among those m ilitary men who had
been directly rasooloted w ith the formative period of m illtray aviation.
In the United States the proponents of air power hod chrated a w e llordered e o ia ^. three objectlvra were of mo|or significance* an independent air
trace; o c c^tm c# of the doctrine of strategic bombardment; and an aircraft oopabte
of the strategic ro le .^ These mnbltlora were oontinuolly fru$tr#ed by the subordina
tion of the Air Corps to the Army, lecorae W th# arrmgrammt the assigned roira
of the A ir Cor;» wrae direct support of the Army cmd ooWol defense ^ the notion.^
N e ith # o f thrae wra regraded by the air leocbrs m being o f primary Importraice,
although the latter trak fmd w ithin it the seeds of a bomber |xrogram of unhraalded
size.
In iom iory, 1931, rai c^eenient hod Wen mode between Oraierol Douglas
MacArthur, Army Chief o f Staff, and Admiral WllUcm V . Pratt, Chief o f Naval
Operations, which called o truce to the d i^ t e over the role of air powra in c o o ^ l

defense. The terms of the agreement gave the A ir Corps specific respans&Hities

®Mrak S. Watson, Chief of Stafft Prewra Plra# and Préparât lorn, V ol.
VI of United States Army w W raB 'W # II,
tons U.S. Government Printing O ffice , 195%, pp» 24-25.
"^Craven and Cate, I, 17.
% W ., p. 68.
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to defend against hostile naval elements. In order to fu lfill this role a suitable
aircraft had to be provided—a requirement that ultim ately bore fruit m the B-17
long-range bomber. Thus, when the United States entered the war, the production
lines for a first-class bomber were in operation.^
The early problems of the Army A ir Forces^ can be summarized in one
word—shortoges. Even though President Roosevelt began the expansion of the A ir
Corps in 1939, the weeks and months after Pearl Hwbor were fille d with the frus
trations that arose from not having what was needed to do the job at hand. The
plea of the President for in itia l production of 50,000 planes a ye® wra more rhetraicol than it was a goal that could be met by the aircraft industry, even under
optimum conditions.
A most vexing problem was the development of a program to synchronize
the production of aircraft with airfield construction and aircrew training. At no
time was there a static plan. News from the theaters stimulated expanded require
ments; combat experience dictated urgent modifications and spec fications were in
constant flux. To keep up with the frenetic pace of events the entire methodology
of procurement had to be changed. Departing from painfully meticulous paper
routines, hraried officials adopted “ judicious shortcuts** and the telephone became
an instrument of life-saving effectiveness. Perhaps the q ix jlity of production de
clined, but quantity in time of need wra adequate coqiporaation.®
^Craven and Cate, I, 30 , 61-67.
^The Army air establishment wra so designated on 20 June 1941 (Craven
and Cate, I, 11%.
8
Craven and Cate, I, 104-110.

66

lv # i hod th® qlrraaff m lW out of Hie fW ra le* onto prepared a irfie ld i
oik! Into the hcaidi of tfoined air

ground crews, two other prob(#ra hod to be

faced. First, the desperate requirements of Hie toyol A ir Force demanded on op*
portionment of the rmomom* This, of course, memt that certain American units
were derived of their equipment, which in turn delayed their entry i##o combat
operations. Second, #%®t from betiq; used in tfolfilng units, the bombers wore
ineffective w#H they hod been flown oversera to Hieoter locotlom . Fra Inmcperienced youths only w e ^ out of flying schools, the prrapect of Iraig hours over Hws
wnffiendly A tlantic In an ynfamilira oircroft wra o #cllonging am i#w ent. But for
those who lonckd safe In liqjland, their real rackol had just b ^ n .
Austere peocetWe budgets Wd equipped the Royal A ir Force B c# e r
Commrmd with what Sir Arthur Honrlf called a “shop window" force. It wra a fraoe
utterly locking In depth, which, when war come, found itself faced w ith the d il
of being, on the one hand, uneèle to field opraotional units without taking çravs
cmd equipment owoy ffom the sorely needbd tro k ili^ program, or on the raher hand,
to reduce Aront-llne strength by withdrawing crews for training codrra. Hod not the
period of the "pWny war" allowed time for the build-up o f Bomber Ccmmsmd, the
subsequent year* o f cperctkm* against Germcmy would have been vastly dlf& rent.
Even Hien, the mraiths of respite were a ll too sW rt.^
Contrray to early expectatiraw, the few bombers ovotlièie for attacks on
Gramrai forces were umèle to opercde effectively In the (kiytime. Aside from their
Û
Harris, op. c it. , pp. 34-45.
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short rcK^e, th© bombers were hratdico{^d by defensive ramoment s>##m thot heé
limited fields of coveroge—o deficiency soon recognized by the Luflwoffe whose
pilots shifted their otfocks to se#ors that ovoided the defensive firepower of the
|A
bombers.
Equolly discourogtr^ wra lock of w lf-seollng fuel tcmks# Without them
tanks, one bullet oeuld send o bomber down in flames. It wra mot until a ll of the
fighter units hod been equifqaod with the tonks that o re tra it progrom was undkHrtaken
to benefit the bomber squo&ora. ^ ^
Progressively higher Irases, coupW w ith indignation at the Oeneon bomb
ing of Coventry ond London, led to a d iift in s tro t^ y . Daylight precision ottocki
were obcmdoned and Bomber C w m w d turned to night action. Imphral* i^aon spe
c ific oim it^ points d k (^^d o ff, and by November 1941 area tragets were regularly
selected.
With the shift in strategy to night operations a new problem wra inkraWwd—
the very great d iffic u lty in n a v i^tin g from EnglraW to a point over Ommmy where
the bombs could be released with a degree of certainty that they would fa ll upon
their target. Lord Cherwell, the Prime Minister's scientific advisor, <btermli»ed

^^hra% he cramonded No. 5 Group, H#rl# remWIed this problem by
contracting Far Improved turr#s from o nearby manufacturer without going through
normal wpply chcmnels* Bureaucratic IndlgraHlon wra high, but the results w #e
fflqxrrasive (Hrarls, op* c it#, pp. 39-4%.
^^Sauitdby, op. c it. , p. 76.
12
Soun#y,

c it., pp. 110-111.
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th # tw Q -thirè of the crews failed to drop their bombs within five miles of the
eralgned t®get. The te d in im i difficulties of the navigator had not received the
soma attention from the scientific community as hod the problem of the fig h t#
p ilo t, for the very obvious reason of “putting first t h li^ fim t.
The early failure to gain air supremacy over the Luftwaffe resulted In
heavy attrition o f crews and airraoff. This one failure was. In point of fact, the
key Inadequacy o f both Bomber Commmd and the Eighth A ir Force*
In order to secure the protection afforded by evraion and ruse, Bomber
Command wra d m W the c è lilty to achieve Hie necessary concenWtlan
emd accuracy, raid In order to achieve the necessary raancentrotirai raid
accuracy, the Eighth A ir Force wra denied the protect Irai given by evralon
and ruse*
Sir j^ th u f Harris believed sincerely thot massive assault# against ma{ra
cities, If pumied without diversion would bring the GermraW to heel, b b Invasion
would be required; only occupation.

The Americans were not so scuiguinc. They

bel W ed that invasion wra a precondition of eucce#, Crairaquently the bombli^
opraotlora shmild be directed o^alnst the Luflwoffe and its supporting iiW stry on
o “round-the-clock" basts* The British A ir Staff hod not the sran# optimism os
Harris. Its senior officers were of the

In Ion that unless German aircraft production

were ewrtelled, the build-up of night fighters might. In the end, defeat Bomber
^%he Erarl o f BIrkradiead, The P rofeyy ramd è e PrWe Minister# The
O fficia l Life of Frofessra* F, A , LindSsènnrVlsSïm üierw elf '"'ÿlSHraiî" "tloughtrai
R rm % T ra 9 m

y r i^ ^

--------------------------------------

^Webster raid Fronkictnd, U l, 294.
^% orrls, op. c it* , p. 263.
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Cormncmd, Hence ihe Air Stoff sided w ith the Atnmrloont and directed Fkrris to
lend weight to the effort against the aircraft Industry.
For mraiy mraiHis the results were unrewrading. The Royal Arr Force hod
not yet developed its night bombing technique* to the point where higfj occurocy
cXHild be expected. The United States Army A ir F®ce$ were cranmitted to doyllgW
bombing, cmd their sorties agoW deep tragets proved too costly to be r^teoted
w ith any cmsistency, thereby m inim izli^ the overall effects because the Germans
were cèle to moke those repairs a ltic a l to sustained {production.
The real reason for the succession of failures (American in (aortlcul®) wra
the lock of long-rmge escort fightras. Kmnving the vulnereèif tty of Hie bombers
without escort, the Luflwgffe held o ff raigc^ing the formations until the racrat
fighters were forced by ffiel shorten© to break off ond return to their brara, Tlie
Germcm pilots then {pressed home savage and well-coordinated attacks against the
bombers a ll the way to the target m m cmd thence back again to the pick-up point
where rendezvous wra to be made with the escorts d l^ tc h e d to guord the bombers'
return.

Hot until long-rra^e escort fighters were mode available did the situa

tion chcmge. When this Ixqapened, ond ra the blows to the German o il iraW try
coused raiticol Hxirtagra In ov lotion fuel, the pow# of Hi® Luftwaffe declined.
W ebster ond Frraiklrad, II, 5*6.
^^Adolf Gollond, The F W oral the Lrati The Rise ond Foil of the Getmcm
FWiter Fracei, 1 ^ -1 9 4 5 , "w m rM m vy^
Y ® ky''"H w y H blf c I T
CraipoSy,
1.

’®lbid., pp. 204-210.
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Th®off®mîv0 agoîrssfr Germort încbstry failed diamally dufimgdcarbt®$$

and during d a y llÿ if whm v is ib ility was <è#cur®d by elouds. Then both Bomber
Cmrnnond and the Eighth A ir Fore® hod to depend^ for any sort of précision, upon
radar. Although by 1944 ninety per cent of the British heavy bombers wwe e^ul^ied
with a type o f radar known as H2S, the state of the technology wc® such that ac**
curate results could not be expected.

The American equipment 042X**-a mods*-

fied H2S) wm a little more accurate but In very ësort s u p p l y # T h e resulH, o ft#
a fu ll year of <^eratioii, were dlsc^poinfli^. The blind bombing raids accompli^ed
little fmxre tlwm to keep ^essure on the eneroy—itself a goal of the POINTKANK
plan-"-but without the precise attacks upon the Wx)b{ectlves that would have
meas# succe»*

21

There were other l# s important problem that hindered the Combined
Bomber Offensive, but their effects w # e In Wg® measure overcome by the sheer
weight and p^sistency o f the bombing <^Msratims. Nwnbered omor^ these problww
wmre aircraft shortage in the Joint recormaissemce program f^ early tW in lca l
d lfflo iltle s in photo-*fnt@rpretation that rwulted in inaccuract© &mage ossessmmt;^

and Frankiand, IV# 14.
February 1944 only fiftems otrcraft were fitted w ith the equipment.
Consequently one bcxnber served as leader for sixty others without radar, whose
bombardiers relwsed upon sl#$ol from the leocbr (Oroven and Cate, 111, 14-20).

^ ^Craven and Cote, III, 14-20.
H. Arnold, Global Mlwion (New York# tW per & Brothers, 1949),
p . 377.
^^e b s te r m d ftronklond. III, 211.
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and poor on&wne# (dsouf fourteen per cent of the American bombs were

d e fe c tiv e )

.^4

in addition to the afsx'ementioned, there w w the problem of communication between
the militcny cntd the civtlkm scientists whose talents has been cbown into the t# o l
wcnr effort.
World Wmr U wc® without doubt the most m’uciot and com ply m^perotlve
venture ever undertaken by hmmm beings. Because of the total nature of the war,
many individuals were involved, some directly m é othem indirectly, who In earlier
perlotb would have ol%@rved from the fringes of the w m o. in the first group were
the civiliOBW who were affected by bombing ottacksi in the semnd p*oup were the
scientists. These, said Sir Henry Ttzard, only just before the wc® **. . .were called
in to study the neecb of the Services, os distinct &om their wonts. . .and then only
os a last resort. . . .
The problems of the air services dmnrmded o proportionately Iwge shore
of scientific talent—then, as now, a voludble comnmdlty. Nowhm^e was the need
greater than in con|unctlon with the Combined Bomber Offensive. Apart firom the
pure migineertng problems associated w ith inqsrovement o f o iro a ft and equipment,
an entirely new discipline was born from the need to predict and assess bombing re
sults—a specialty roughly described os “operations analysis. “ AlMwugh Hie connotatim is one of an “ a##r-the-fact“ c r o is a i, sudi was fear from the case. Oftentimes

^^Craven and O de, HI, 795.
^^^uoted by R. V . jones in “ Science smd the State,® hkiture. V ol. 200,
No# 4901 (Octobw 1963), 7-14. Sir Henry T iw d was the leading KfWtih figure
In the development of radar.
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the pdgmmt» of the m oly*# (who would, for ImtcMice, #ugg#t tcnget W egwle#
ond p rW itW dmrlved ftom theoretiool ooloulotkHH, there being no emplrtool
stomdmrds to go by.
into sudti det#mlnotion# went the mmbined wisdom o f stotlstleions, earno m iiti, geogre^mrs, photogronmietrto, end score# o f other specWllsts. The pro
ducts of their delibwrotiom wore fundamW olly oW roct m é hod to be Integpoted
with both fnllltory expediency m d m liitsry copobility to then become volid ww
ob|ectives.
Ikttrolnod os they were in the somewhat rigid pottems of milItcary thought,
the scientists often di#mr@d among themselves and w ith their m littery associates.
These w #e not a lto ^ th ^ peevidi bickerings; in some Instance tW y becsme sub
stantive is w ^ of high policy.
One of the most noteworthy examples of this d ivisW o f thought raised
^rove éauW sèout the m tlre s tro t^ lc bombing effort. It was the clw h In England
between Lord Charwell and Sir Hemry Tirord over the Imue of crea bomblr^.
Cheiweil held that Imlving the bombing error would hove the net effect
of doubltr^ the slate o f the bomber fo rc e .^ A f^fylng this reasoning to Omrmcm
populations and productim centws, he postulated a A m # e index that could be
used in e s tim a tif the results to be achieved by m y given attack. Tlxord disagreed,
26
Ct P. Snow, Science m d Government (Cw#idm % Harvard Ikshrersity
Press, 1961), pp. 47-^53.
'
^ R . V . jones, “ Emotion, Science m d the Bomber O^mwive,® The
listener 0 0 November 1961).
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claiming that the Index was five times too high, which, if true, would have dis
credited the entire bomber o ffe n sive .^
The view of CHetwetl prevailed* (And it Is orguciale that even hod llmmé
been demonstrably correct, the mood of the British people would not hove sanctioned
a reversal of the bombing policy.) The point of the ddsote that Is Instructive to the
historicm, how ^m '. Is that this difference in scientific interpretation became a
&enzy of emotion mvà provided both the bottls^pound and the wmnunition for the
prqKMients and exponents of olr power to w o ^ a private battle sepcrote from, #%d
damaging to, the prwecution of the main strife. "The persisting lesson is that,
even when we try to be dbfectlve and detached, emotion cmd self-inter## frequently
enter into our dec Worm, be they p o litiW , m ilitary, or s c im tlflc .
To soy that the technological fxobtems o f the Ccmblmsd Bomber Offensive
had no effect upon the outcome of the wmr would be Inaccurate* But likewise to
say that their e^ect was ever of a m a^itude to cent doubt upon the ultimate victory
of the A llies wm#ld be sim ilarly in error. Some would perhopi mifgest that the end
of the war w w delayed cppreclr&ly by the technical di#iculties thot caused In
accurate, and therefore ineffective, bombli^* Others might advance the more extrmne view that the air situation was in a sense Immotmrlal bemuse the central issue
was decided by the great struggle between the land camimi. The truth probably lie#
mmewhere in between.
^S now , op. c it., p. 49.

29Jones, The Listenw (30 Novembm^ 1961).

CHAPTER V II
SUMMARY
In the decade preeedir^ the onW erf World Wor H the odvence o f aviation
technology hod fixxb pw *&le the <Wel<qment o f airm oft sultdble, for heavy hombsng o p e ra fim , m d the m ilitary doctrlnw of the day wme fufF lclm tly Wvonced to
give nmre than lip service to the c o n c ^ t of strategic homhordment. But when the
war started both the Royal A ir Force Bomber Command m d the United States Army
A ir Forces were mreod^ for the roles #$ey were fore-orrWlned to play* The failure
o f both governments to accurately conos the dweots which hmed thm i hW hod the
direct effect of denying to their air s # v ic ^ the olfm slve copobilitis® that could
have, albeit with #)me sacrifice, bem attained, Consespently, when die need
arose for a force-in-being to send ogairot Germany, there mm only available thot
force sufficient to strike k h m whose w e îÿit wm little more than syndsolle.
These ©Hbrts bolstered A llied morale but did little to Interfere with the
progress of Hitler*# wcsr. N ot until late in the mm did the bclm ce d ilft from a desperote struggle for swvlvol to a sm dltion o f unequivocal mW unalterable superiority*
The ou#ere begirmlngs, the m w lng years of uncertainty, m d the clm wt
apocalyptic flmidi whlWi marked the bomber operatlom have provickd the cqaponent
m d proponent of a ir power alike w ith a wide range of historical incident to support
their various y\m/$ (tome mctreme in their construction). This same wealth of e vidm ce, mwmined in part in the cow## of this study, cm be called upon to support
the conclusion that. In gm erol, the potm tial of die bomber effort wm ^eater than
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ît# achievement. This l« not to suggest, however, that weighed c ^ lm t the scale
of available evlrfence, the achievement can be judged to be 1 ^ than m e of the
truly decisive factors In the victory over Germany. ^
A fair appraisal ^ the Omibined Bomber Offeiwlve would include the
fdl lowing major points#
(1)

The years that have passed since the preporotlm o f the United States

Strategic Bombing Survey (1945) hove disclosed no new evidence to significantly
,: «
alter its conclusion that “A llie d air power was decisive in the mm in Western
iurcqm .“

The air suprmnacy of the Alt!#» mode possible the invcnlon of the Con

tinent cmd keyed the ^ o r to final victory. However, overstctemm# of the contri
bution of air power imist be avoided. Nowhere is this caution mc®e c^ipropriate
than In evolucding the occomplishmmts of the Condslned Bomber (Mfensive. Its
successes m d failures have to be considered w ithin the lorgw framework of the
totol A llie d war effort. Nor Is A is on o^er-the-fact |uc%mmt. It Is not pomible
horn the evidence ovotlcble today to conclude that an attempt was mode by the
A llies “ to win the wcr” by #roteg!c bombing, even though there were those who
believed &*ch o course o f action to be the wisest strategy to follow*
The success of m y bomblr^ campaign (of mmnive scale using m nvm tim ol
I

But even Hi Is judgment must be tentative, bfet until the vast #ore of
informotion relating to the conflict between Germmy m d the USSR is mode a va ildsfe for detailed scrutiny mn a more positive ossemmmt be mocb.
\lSSBSi Qvorall Report, p. 107.
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bomb#) il depmdmt upon the tomnege of bombs dropped m d the target system that
receives thmn# But these ere m t the m iy two relevoi# fmtors* A d d itim o ily, the
elemmt o f time must be Introduced into the equWlon, Bearing o il o f these factor#
in mind, it diouid then be recalled that the fu ll weight of the British end Âmerlem
bomber offensive did m t materiali*e until late in the war* O f the total bomb
tonn@@e d ro f^ d upon Ommmy, 72 per cent fe ll o#er 1 July 1944.^ The o n te c e ^ t
21 per cent w«a spread over o five year psrlod, and, moreover, the period was one
durit^ which, W the meet pert, the technological odvon^mienti ond the defensive
nwmure# ovolleèle fowcard the end of the war were cèdent from A llied crsenel#. C m sequently, the results mhieved from the bombing oom poi^ early in the war were
neitW r mortal nor pwmonently dmncagir^. In this latter r e ^ c t , the remorWsle ingm uity of the Germans in repairing war domoim mW be token Into amount.
Furthermore, a rough anal>#ts of the target systmn reveals a very close
Interrelation between the Ccmibined Bomber Offensive m d land and sea operations#
The break-out o f the total bomb tmns#@ 0?y per cent again# q#ecific twget categori®#) indicates that the prepondermce of the bombers* activities were “non-strotsgict**^
industrial
Trmsportotim
M ilitery/noval foe.
Cities
Total

3

lb W .,p . 71,

13
32
30
25
15®

% id .
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A ll of these foctors token together lead to an overall |u%nent that the
Combined Bomber Offensive was cm Integral part of, m é not sepmrcèl# ham, the
A llie d i^ond strategy, m d that its succ^ees can be icW tlfied m much with Its
“ cooperative** role os with its independent objoctlves*
(2)

Beyond Hie name “Cmiblned Bon&m^ Offensive, ** there li little to

suggest that the British and ^ e r i w i bomber op^otions were ever really combined.
That they were complementary there is no doubt—but even in this r e ^ c t the Inter
act im could have been closer. What was laeklr^ was unity of commmd. tWd there
been, first, unity, and second, firm eamrcise o f unified command, obvious economlw
of force and greater mncentrotion of effw t would hove been possible. As if wm,
there were too many lines of influence and too much push ond pull from various
pres»jre groups. This lack o f direction from dbove served only to create a vemxiiR
w hiëi wm cBnply filled by the personal convictions of Harris and Spootz, the leaders
of the two operational commands, who, in turn, led their forces along the sepcrote
paths o f their own choosing* Without precise aims, there was too much latitude fmr
interpretive strategic to be formed, but wUhout the assurance that their end-ob{eets
would be coincident.
(3)

In a somewhat negative vein, even the severest critics of the Com

bined Bomber Ofrenslve mm be answered by quWioning what im uld have hcf^ened
hW it not bew omrried out to the extent tW it was* Granting that wch speculation
Is perlKf® mstreme, there ore, neverthelws, some lA viow derWctim# to be drown.
(o) With a relatively untouched industry (os in the tkiited Stated, the Germans
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would have been able to wage a war of logistics whose «foration ccmnot be estlmated,

(b) The destruction of the Lufrwoffe and Its w^»ortlng e ll indfostry under

wrote the Invwlen of the Continent os a succ#sfol operation. Bed the Luftwaffe
been able to eppoee OVERLORD In stre*%th, an liwaslon route throuÿi Italy might
Wve becmie a necessity. (4 Tbe V - l and V -2 rocket programs preswted a threat
of olm ning proportions to the A llies. And of even greatm^ seriousness was the work
in progrm on the atom bomb. The elimination of these two thrw ts by air attack
denied Germany her rwnolnlng hc^ies of victory.
(4

The effects o f W mblr^ upon German morale were {xobcbly over

estimated, and, If this is true, the quantity of bomW dropped on German cities
(25 per cent of the total) may hove been entirely dlqwr^ortlonate to the require
ment. W hile the surface conclusion to be ckown from this would be to spook c riti
cally of A llie d intelligence, there is a more funcfomentol, but less precise, inference.
It can be wggested that the Allies lost sight of the foot that the wear was not o th ir^
o f itself but w«a beirqi fought for o political pui^(%# outside of if. Thus the fxeoccupotion With moons was substituted for holding to the end. Whm the attainment
of "victory® is the only real lim it imposed upon the con«foct of warfcare, one® b e # n ,
it is almost certain Hint it w ill not end until o il of the countm have been played.
Hod this Inevitc&illty been uncforstood by the people who stcxted the wca*, they

^As it wm, the attacks c ^ lm t G#mon industry were a "three #eps
fmrword, two stixT* bock® s ^ lr * The cenëinatkm of Germmn rm m u r^^b im in
rwter#im% or reloccdion o f industry «md the lock of A llie d "follow-up** bombii^
was ovwoome In the end only by the d ie # weight of the attacks themselves.
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might hove refroWed.^
(5)

Th#@ is o peoilicir cmgst connected with modem thinking «èw t

the Confined Bomb# O ffm slve. It Is o pm isfent, If sometkn# eoretully dis^lsed,
them© of g u ilt. The bomb# offmslv©, so the thinking goes, did not win the wor,
therefore. It wm bed. No one wceits to be cmocloted w ith o s tro t^y thot produced
so much misery ond yet did not bring victw y. Curiously, this <#titud© does not
seem to ottoch to reflection t ^ n the bombing 0»oth fire roldl cmd otom bomb^ o f
Jopcm becmise the wm mm won without invoslon. Hence the bombing wm good#
This Is on odd twisting of voluei, because when the major bombings took ploce,
icpcm wm then desperately close to the end m d would probcèly hove succtm&ed
y
Without either m Invoslm or the bombing. What seems to be cbsent from the
thinking daout these phewmono (the bombings o f Genncmy cmd Jcpon) 1$ the rea li
zation that they were but o port o f the whole q»ectrum o f violence im plicit In modern
warfare# Were this to be more clecrly seen, th# e would be more ottentlm givm
to how worn con be o vo l# d them hew they should be waged.

^od oy there it recognition that the bcm bli^ of cities is cè|ection<d>le—
hence the odvococy of a "counterforce" strot^gr directed toward the annihilation
o f the en#ny*s m ilitary capability. But paradoxically, the people who today ore
mo# likely to decry the bombing of G#m«m cities ere the some people who would
have us possessed o f only a handful of nuclear weapons to be used In vengeance
attacks upon the og^essor*# c lti# .
^How widespread this Imowlecfo# was at the time, if at a ll, »i on entirely
d iff# e n t matter.

80

p o s r a ir r
If wo* IS OS Cloumwitz scys it isW on extension of politics by other meom®—
then we must petforce choose ways of wcr that bear some relationship to the character
of our politics* Political alms tlxxt or© grandiose «and high-blown produce war policies
that are equally inflated and imuW tontlal. Throf^fghout history this relationship hm
not been particularly relevant becmise the static technology of wrnrf## imposed on
upper lim it to the odiievcèle degree of violence—regardless of the irrespoiulbifity
o f political goals*
In World War II a break-through occurred and Hiefe existed an olterotlon
of the old balcmce. It becmie possible for m ilitary might to run beyond political pur
pose* Since then the trend has steeperwd eaqxwentially* Were our politics new to
become so immoderate os to ascribe ev#i a taint of legitimacy to genocide, we Ixsve
the genie in the W ttI# to do our bidding.
Should we bo able to retain a moderate and realistic political outlook, there
remoli® hope that we cm find some way back down the lodd# toward m ilitary scmlty*
One way to cfo this is to devote as much attention to devising, and speculating upon,
post-wcr scenarios os w©

in developing idem about how wars might stcrt.

The basic problem is not really a d iffic u lt one. It I* a matter o f making
means fît ends* The real d ifficu lty is, of courw, in finding a way by which two
k ^ ile , suqsiciom, msd very difrermnt societies con be led to identify common and
reasondble goals. If this mn be done, Hie means th # i mmme true relevcmce. If
we cemnot do this, the mwwqpences of failure me q^xwm it.
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